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IN misPAPIaIwe compare trends in capital formation and financing
in a number of countries whose economies are organized as business
systems. The data are scanty, particularly for periods long enough
to provide historical perspective in viewing problems of economic
growth. Diversity of definitions affects the comparability even of
the current estimates, and the figures must be• examined critically
before they can be used. Under these circumstances a portion of
the ensuing discussion is devoted to questions of definition, to pro-
vide unequivocal guides to the figures; and, on the principle that
some rough order of magnitudes is better than complete ignorance,
the qualifications detailed below are disregarded in the attempt to
draw some inferences from the data.
The paper falls into three major sections. In the first we deal
with the proportion of domestic capital formation to national prod-
uct. We emphasize domestic capital formation first because, as
historical experience suggests, domestic investment precedes foreign.
We discuss the proportion to national product, an over-all measure
of economic activity, to avoid complicating the comparisons by
differences in absolute units.
The second section is devoted to consideration of foreign invest-
ment, i.e. the foreign-based component of total capital formation.
From these data we can determine the shares of domestic capital
formation contributed by foreign and domestic sources; or, con-
versely, the share of total domestic savings flowing, on net balance,
abroad. By combining the data on foreign investments with those
on domestic capital formation discussed in Section 1, we can derive
the proportion of total capital formation to total national product.
In the third section we deal with the various sources of capital
formation financing. Unlike the data on international capital move-
ments and domestic capital formation, of which a stock, if varied
and patchy, has accumulated because of long-standing interest,
the data on various channels of domestic financing of capital
formation are exceedingly meager. 'Yet the topic must be considered
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explicitly and available data or hints utilized, so that at least the
relevant questions which may serve to guide future inquiry can be
adequately formulated.
In order not to interrupt the discussion we have put all the
tabular material into Appendix A. The data-minded student will
probably find this appendix the most valuable and important part
of the paper, and the text partly a guide to the tables and partly
a tentative summary of the conclusions they suggest.
1. Proportion of Domestic Capital Formation
to National Product
QUESTIONS OF SCOPE
Domestic capital formation as measured here comprises additions
to construction (including residential), to producers' durable ma-
chinery and equipment, and to business and government inventories.
Some of the available estimates exclude some of the items: e.g.
most of them exclude changes in government inventories, and some
of the long-term estimates also omit changes in business inventories.
In some estimates the definition of producers' equipment is not
explicit, and the question arises whether, for example, military tools
in the hands of government and small hand tools, etc., are included.
But, by and large, it is this total that, with varying degrees of
grossness and netness in the additions, is approximated in the
estimates of capital formation.
No standard definition of capital formation exists at present; and
I doubt whether one is desirable now. The definition given here—
which includes government capital represented by military weapons
and construction, and excludes consumer durable goods other than
housing—can easily be defended. On the other hand, cogent argu-
ments can be found for the definition that excludes the former and
includes the latter—which Raymond W. Goldsmith used in his recent
study of saving,1 a concept identical on a nationwide basis with
capital formation.
However defined, the customary measures of capital formation
tend to underestimate the true volume. They exclude most invest-
ment of resources in clearing land and in other improvements made
by farmers' own labor—an important component in earlier periods—
and current outlay on research and market promotion—an important
component in later periods.
1RaymondW. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Princeton
University Press, 1955.
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Even more important than the differences among current defini-
tions and the omissions just noted is the much wider range possible
when the relevance of capital formation to different analytical pur-
poses and problems is considered. If capital means tools directly
employed in the economic process of production under business and
even public auspices, should residential construction—quantitatively
an important component of capital formation as defined here—be
included? In what sense does housing help to augment the material
product, except in the rather tenuous one of yielding imputed (or
monetary) net rent? For a society bent on forcing the pace of its
economic growth, with particular emphasis on industrialization, resi-
dential construction hardly seems to be bona fide capital, compara-
ble with railroad equipment, blast furnaces, or even inventories. By
the same rule, some additions to public capital, e.g. those designed
for social services to individuals, may also seem to be more in the
nature of consumption than capital formation. It is at least conceiva-
ble that under conditions of forced economic growth and indus-
trialization, capital—and hence capital formation—may be viewed as
limited to plant, equipment, and inventories that are directly service-
able as tools.
However, for some purposes neither this narrow definition of
capital and of its formation nor the one used in the estimates here
but a much wider one may be more pertinent. For example, if a
long-term rise in national product per capita or per worker is taken
to describe economic growth, it may be desirable to define capital
as means, and capital formation as all uses of current product, that
contribute to such rises. In other words, domestic capital formation
would include not only additions to construction, equipment, and
inventories within the country, but also all other expenditures ex-
cept those necessary to sustain output at existing levels. It would
include outlays on many items now comprised under consumption,
e.g. outlays on education, recreation, and material luxuries that con-
tribute to the greater health and productivity of individuals, and
all expenditures by society that serve to raise the morale of the
employed population.
This exposition of the wide scope possible for capital formation
leads to two observations. First, changes in scope will yield different
levels and trends in the estimates. Both the contrasting levels of the
proportion of capital formation to national product in different coun-
tries and their trends based on a wide definition will be different
from those based on a substantially narrower one. This will also be
21KUZNETS
true of the structure of financing: the financing of capital formation
more narrowly defined is distributed among various sources in an
entirely different way from that of capital formation of much wider
scope.
Second, the choice of a definition must obviously be guided by
the major use to which the resulting measures are to be put. One can
escape this choice only by preparing estimates corresponding to the
widest possible definition, and by providing details on components
so that narrower totals can be constructed. In this paper we do not
and cannot use the widest definition, and can justify our choice
merely on the grounds of practical expediency.
Our interest here is in the comparative economic growth of na-
tions. In pursuit of that interest it would have been best to use the
wider definition suggested above. The measures used here and in
many other statistical studies, which correspond to the narrower defi-
nition, present an incomplete, and therefore somewhat misleading,
picture of differences between developed and underdeveloped econ-
omies or between the early and later phases in the growth of de-
veloped economies. Not only capital formation, in its narrower sense,
but also consumer expenditures, whose contribution to the increased
productivity of the population varies as the consumption structure
varies, are fundamental to the understanding of economic growth and
its phases. Capital is what capital does: it raises the capacity for
economic production. The minor share that capital formation as now
measured constitutes of national product, particularly on a net basis,
in both developed and underdeveloped countries is far from a true
measure. It is hardly informative to say that net capital formation
is, on the average, 10 to 15 per cent of national product in the
leading industrial nations and 5 per cent or less in the underde-
veloped ones. It would be more telling if we could say that the
productivity-raising outlays in a developed country are about half
of its national product (as they well may be) but only a few per
cent in an underdeveloped country. Even more important, with the
broader definition of capital we would have to examine carefully all
newly produced resources and select, classify, and measure those
that contribute in any way to greater productivity. We thus would
get a better view of the conditions under which capital, in the nar-
rower sense of the term, is most effectively utilized.
Unfortunately, the available data do not permit the use of the
wide definition of capital formation. A narrower definition had to
be employed because the whole- stock of available estimates barely
22INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
suffices to measure it even for enough countries and periods to per-
mit some broad inferences—at least within the limits of time and
effort that can be devoted to this paper. Thus only a part of what
is wanted can be measured.
The present definition corresponds to the accepted concept of
national product. Durable consumer goods other than construction
are excluded because to treat such goods as a "business," and in-
clude their value under capital goods and the imputed income from
them under national product, did not seem warranted. Military
equipment is included because it is analogous to a variety of pro-
tective capital goods included under business capital formation:
there seems to be no good reason for excluding munitions while in-
cluding fences (and, for that matter, business structures which pro-
vide protection from the weather)2
GROSS AND NET
According to the definition used here, domestic capital forma-
tion comprises additions to the stock of goods within the country in
the hands of business and government, and housing in the hands of
consumers. These additions can be measured gross, i.e. as the total
newly turned out, or net of current consumption. Estimates for both
gross and net capital formation are used below: the former are
gross of current consumption of durable capital (construction and
equipment), the latter are net of it. Changes in inventories are taken
on a net basis in both.
We discuss gross capital formation, in addition to net, for several
reasons. First, consumption of durable capital over a year or even
over a somewhat longer period is difficult to estimate. This may ex-
plain the erratic behavior of differences in the estimates of consump-
tion among various countries. Second, the consumption estimates
for the business sector are based upon depreciation allowances, and
to that extent reflect a source of capital formation financing that may
or may not be used, depending upon conditions. Third, individual
home-owners tend to disregard the allowance for depreciation, and
thus view savings as gross of that item. To the extent that such prac-
tices convert the consumption estimate into a measure of means
of financing gross capital formation—means that are indissolubly
2Thisis based upon a heroically simple assumption. A more realistic alterna-
tive would have involved trying to determine how much military investment
is "defensive" and how much "aggressive." Inclusion of the latter would require
inclusion under national product of the yield of aggression. The difficulties of
such an approach need not be stressed.
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merged with "net" savings—a study of gross capital formation and
its financing may be more fruitful than one of net. Finally, "replace-
ment" of a capital good is rarely merely substituting for one tool
another of the same quality: after all the price adjustments possible,
$100 in 1929 prices spent in 1939 would have meant better equip-
ment or a more suitable structure than $100 in 1929 prices spent in
1909. For all these reasons the concept of gross capital formation is
at least as important as that of net, and may even be more useful
for some purposes.
In discussing current capital consumption we used the term
"durable capital assets" without defining it. Since its scope affects
the magnitude of capital consumption, it should be noted that re-
pairs and maintenance are included in some of the estimates used
here and excluded from others. For the countries where these out-
lays are included under gross capital formation, current consump-
tion presumably is larger relatively than for others (e.g. the United
States and countries following the practice of the Organisation for
European Economic Co-operation) where an attempt is made to ex-
clude them on the grounds that they are usually treated as current
expenses and are not subject to the postponable depreciation al-
lowance.
But this item is minor compared with two questions concerning
the turnover of durable capital assets: Should the gross flow of such
assets include not only newly produced assets, but also those that
were placed on the market and changed hands during the year?
Should the study of financing include the financing not only of the
new gross total of capital goods, but also of the turnover of existing
ones?
The reason for these questions lies in the relation between mo-
bility of capital and its contribution to productivity, and thus to eco-
nomic growth. The ease with which existing capital goods can
change hands in a better adjustment to needs is as important in
many ways as the addition of newly produced capiti1. Such shifts of
capital goods may or may not require external financing. But since
we distinguish durable assets because we recognize that their cur-
rent consumption is not an unequivocal act of disappearance and
gives rise to sources of financing, we should be consistent and recog-
nize that such assets—because they are durable and continue to
exist as capital goods—can change hands and hence better serve their
purposes. The existence or absence of financial and other facilities
for such shifts is, therefore, an important matter. For this reason we
24INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
repeat: Should we not deal with the gross supply on the market of
at least the durable capital goods_-instead of new gross capital
formation alone—and search for the sources and mechanisms of the
correspondingly gross savings that are employed to finance such a
flow? The statistical difficulties involved here are obvious, and there
is no point in dwelling on them.
The extension of gross capital formation to gross capital supply,
like the wider scope of capital formation suggested earlier, may
well throw more light on the problems of economic growth. For one
major difference between developed and undeveloped countries, or
between the early and later phases of developed countries, probably
lies in the facilities provided for mobility—in its economic sense—
of existing capital goods. If the data were available, it would be
quite useful to gauge the volume of all durable capital goods
changing hands during the year—distinguishing between those al-
ready existing and those newly produced—and to trace the flow of
savings—including the proceeds of sales, just as we include the de-
preciation allowance under the present concept of gross savings—
through the various channels in the financing of the total durable
capital turnover.
But the data are even scantier for this purpose than for the analysis
of consumption suggested in the preceding section. Here, as in
other macro-economic measurement, we have to be satisfied with
already "netted" out, comprehensive aggregates. These have their
invaluable uses; but, unfortunately, they reveal little about the whole
mechanism of flows and offsetting counterflows that is so important
for our understanding of how the net result was effected, and why
it is so different from time to time and place to place.
THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Tables I-i to I-S in Appendix A relate to the gross and net propor-
tions of domestic capital formation to national product. It would
have been more logical to use domestic product. But total na-
tional product series are more readily available, particularly for the
longer periods; and for all the countries covered in the tables the
difference, in the long run, between total and domestic product was
well within a few per cent of either. No sizable error is introduced,
therefore, by treating the proportions as if they relate to either total
or domestic product.
This statement would probably be much less justified if our records in-
cluded truly "colonial" areas, economies in which income outflows to foreign
enterprises loom large relative to total product.
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Table I-i gives, for a relatively large number of countries, the
proportion of domestic capital formation to national product for a
single pre-Worid War II year (usually 1988) and for a post-World
War II period. Table 1-2 shows the proportion, for a much smaller
number of countries, in the 1920's. Table I-S comprises much
longer records, but for only a few countries. The evidence cannot
be summarized easily, partly because of discrepancies in details
of definition and treatment. A far more important limitation lies
in the sensitivity of the capital formation proportion to short-
term conditions, and it isdifficult, therefore, to infer long-term
levels from short-term data. The figures for 1988, a year marking
a depression whose impact varied considerably in the several coun-
tries, are of uncertain value in determining longer-term levels of
differences. Even the averages for the post-World War II period
may well be atypical, since they must have been affected by
the extraordinary efforts in some countries to repair war ravages
and the no less extraordinary difficulties in many other countries
in the way of such efforts. For the longer-term levels and trends
in capital formation proportions we must rely much more on Tables
1-2 and 1-3, but even those must be used warily. Moreover, our
conclusions may be modified when a fuller range of adequate data
becomes available.
With this warning, we state what seem to be the major statistical
findings suggested by the tables and comment on their rationale.
1. Except for the depressed decade of the 1930's, the long-term
proportion of net domestic capital formation to net national product
ranges from about 5 to about 15 per cent. The proportion for
Sweden in the first decade isthe only one clearly below the
5 per cent level (Table 1-8, C); and there are scarcely any long
periods in which the ratio is significantly in excess of 15 per cent.
This range would persist if domestic net product were used as
a denominator, since the latter would be smaller for those countries
whose net domestic capital formation proportions are well below
15 per cent (e.g England and France), and might be larger for
those whose net domestic capital formation proportions are higher
(e.g. Sweden in later decades, the United States, and Canada).
In speculating about the reasons for this range, we can assume
that the lower limit of the long-term proportion of net domestic
capital formation would be zero or close to it. Unless output could
somehow be maintained while extraordinary economy in the use
of capital was practiced, the gradual exhaustion of the domestic stock
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of capital would force reduction of domestic production. Serious
domestic capital depletion, over the long run, and a consequent
long-term decline in output have occurred in history. But for those
countries within the orbit of Western civilization for which we have
long-term records back to the middle of the nineteenth century, the
series which exclude the war periods do not reveal such situations.
Furthermore, given some growth of total population and some
tendency toward preservation of a countrywide capital-output ratio,
the lower limit of the proportion of net capital formation to net
product would be significantly above zero. Assume that the coun-
try's population is growing at 1 per cent per year, that it requires
a constant suppiy of final output per capita, and that the prevailing
ratio of domestic capital stock to annual output is from 2.5 to 1, to
5 to 1. Unless this ratio can be changed signfficantly, the net domestic
capital formation required will constitute 2.5 to 5 per cent of the
national product—sufficient to increase the capital stock necessary to
produce the greater total (but constant per capita) output required.
Since residential housing and closely related facilities are a sub-
stantial part of capital formation, and since, under the assumed
conditions of constant output per capita, economies in the use of
capital (which would depress the capital-output ratio) are unlikely
(they usually develop in a technologically progressive climate as-
sociated with rising per capita output), the illustration suggests that
even in underdeveloped countries the mere growth of population
would limit the lower level of the net capital formation proportion
unless the per capita output were allowed to decline. In the coun-
tries covered in our tables both population and per capita output
increased; and the low net domestic capital formation proportions
are for early preindustrialization periods (Sweden), or for later
periods of development when retarded growth at home permits
limited use of domestic capital, and savings are in fact channeled
abroad (England and France).
The upper limits on the long-term proportion of net domestic
capital formation to net product can best be explained in terms of
4This argument should be qualified in view of the possible omissions in
customary measures of capital formation, but such omissions are likely to be
only minute fractions of national product. Another possible qualification—
that in advanced and growing societies the mere replacement of capital in-
creases productivity—does not apply to conditions where net capital formation
is close to zero over long periods. For this occurs only in societies where econo-
mies are stagnant; and in them technical progress that explains the capacity-
raising incidence of mere replacement is absent. This comment applies also to
the next paragraph.
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the limits on net savings proportions within a country and on the
relative amount of foreign capital that the country can secure. Both
groups of factors are discussed more appropriately in Section 2,
"Foreign Investment and Total Capital Formation Proportions."
It is sufficient to indicate here that there are obvious limits to which
domestic saving for security can be rationalized and to which in-
equality in income distribution can originate savings beyond the
"rational" security limit; and that the supply of foreign savings is
affected by political conditions and by the small amount of capital
available for foreign investment relative to the demand of the
would-be borrowers.
2. The long-term proportion of gross domestic capital formation
to gross national product ranges from about 10 to about 25 per
cent. There is only one case below the lower limit (Sweden in the
first decade, Table 1-8, C); and the few exceptions above the upper
limit are mostly in the unusual post-World War II period.
While one would assume that some relation exists between the
range for the net domestic capital formation proportion and that
for the gross, theoretically one could derive a markedly different set
of limiting values for the latter from the former. Given a long-term
proportion of net domestic capital formation to net product of 5
per cent as an observed lower limit, one must infer that the cor-
responding lower limit for the gross proportion is above 5 per cent.
Similarly, an observed upper limit of 15 per cent for the net propor-
tion implies a higher one for the gross proportion. One would there-
fore expect the long-term proportion of gross domestic capital
formation to gross product to range from above 5 to above 15 per
cent. But a range from 10 to 25 rather than from 7 to 75suggests
that there are certain limits upon variations in the factors that relate
net and gross capital formation proportions.
These factors are the share of capital formation subject to de-
preciation, i.e. in the present definition the share accounted for by
construction and durable equipment; the length of life of durable
capital assumed in estimating depreciation; and the rate of growth
of product, assuming that the proportion of capital formation to
product over the past period has been constant. The role of these
factors is suggested by the following equation:5
D011—(1+r)
nr
For its derivation see Appendix B—part of the analysis carried through in
the National Bureau's study of capital formation and financing.
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where
D0= depreciationduring time unit 0
G0 =grossnational product during time unit 0
a =proportionof depreciable gross capital formation to total
gross capital formation—assumed constant during the past
f= proportionof gross capital formation to gross national prod-
uct—assumed constant in the past
r =rateof growth of gross national product, per time unit—
assumed constant in the past (so that the link relative of
successive annual GNP's is [1 + r])
n =numberof time units in life span of depreciable capital—
assumed constant, with depreciation calculated along a
straight line.
The constancy assumptions refer to the period included in n.
To illustrate the results one can derive from this equation, we
provide a few values for the fraction that modifies af jn the equation
and that reflects the combined effects of the life period of durable
capital and the rate of growth of gross national product (which is
quite close to the rate of growth of net product).
Value of Value of r:
in Years .01 .03 .05
20 .90 .74 .62
30 .86 .65 .51
40 .82 .58 .43
Using this table, we can easily calculate some examples. For
instance, if we assume that f,thegross capital formation proportion,
is .25 (i.e. at the upper limit), that a is .8 (allowing about a fifth for
net changes in inventories), that r is about 3 per cent per year, and
that the average life of durable capital is 40 years (a combination of
a longer life for construction and a shorter one for producers' dura-
ble equipment), the ratio of capital consumption to gross national
product is .8 X .25 X .58, or 11.6 per cent. The ratio of net capital
formation to gross national product is then 13.4 per cent; and to net
national product, 15.2 per cent. This, of course, is only one way by
which an upper limit of 15 per cent for the net capital formation
proportion can be translated into one of 25 per cent for the gross,
although the values used in this example are, in fact, close to the
United States experience (except that f is closer to 22 per cent, and
n closer to 30 years, yielding a net capital formation proportion of
about 12 per cent).
For a slowly growing country whose gross national product rises
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only 1 per cent per year and whose gross capital formation propor-
tion is about 10 per cent (i.e. at the lower limit), if a is .8 and n is
40, the ratio of depreciation to gross national product is .0656; of
net capital formation to gross national product, .03.44; and of net
capital formation to net national product, .037, or 3.7 per cent. A
somewhat lower a, even if combined with a lower n, would yield
a 5 per cent level for the proportion of net capital formation to net
product.
In the above examples the upper and lower limits of the gross
capital formation proportion have been connected with those of the
net capital formation proportion It would obviously be easy to link
a value below the upper limit for the latter with one at the upper
limit for the former, or a value above the lower limit for the latter
with one at the lower limit for the former. By expanding the brief
table given above to cover other values of r and n and varying a and
we could derive various combinations of the gross and net capital
formation proportions.
Such variations are of little interest since our data on the empirical
values for the several constants used are so scanty; and such analysis
would take us far afield anyway. But two inferences suggested by
the illustrative discussion above are relevant here.
First, the lower the rate of growth of national product, the higher
the relative weight of depreciation in gross capital formation and
the lower that of net capital formation derived as residual. This sug-
gests that in underdeveloped countries, where growth of national
product is moderate, where the life span of durable capital assets
may be short because of rapid physical deterioration even in the
absence of the competitive pressure that produces obsolescence
of capital goods in the more developed countries, and where the
relative share of net change in inventories is not necessarily larger
than in the developed countries, a fairly substantial proportion
of gross capital formation to gross national product may be ac-
companied by an insignificant net capital formation proportion.
Thus if n is 20, a is.8, and the gross capital formation propor-
tion is 20 per cent, an r of .01 yields a net capital formation
proportion of only slightly over 6 per cent; an r of about .5 per
cent per year yields a net capital formation proportion, under the
same conditions, of less than 5 per cent; and when r is 0, the pro-
portion is actually .04 divided by .84, or 4.8 per cent. In that case
it is limited to net additions to inventories, since there are no net
additions to the stock of durable capital. By and large, differences in
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the gross capital formation proportion among developed and under-
developed countries may be relatively much smaller than those in
the net; and the former tend to underestimate the differences among
countries in the share of income constituting net additions to the
capital stock.
The second inference bears upon the effect of acceleration or re-
tardation in the rate of growth of national product. With other
factors constant, acceleration means a reduction in the weight of
depreciation, a higher ratio of net to gross capital formation, and a
higher net capital formation proportion corresponding to a given
gross capital formation proportion. Retardation has the opposite
effect—it increases the relative weight of depreciation and widens
the gap between the gross and net capital formation proportions.
3. At some phase in the growth of a developed country within the
last two centuries there must have been a substantial rise in the capi-
tal formation proportions. Given an increase, or constancy, or at least
a substantial resistance to decline in the capital-output ratios, a
rise in the capital formation proportions is a necessary consequence
of the acceleration in the rate of population growth in the older
countries, if per capita product does not decline. In fact, of course,
the growth phases to which we refer are characterized by acceler-
ated population growth (in older countries), by increases in per
capita output far greater than those observed previously, and often
even by rises in the capital-product ratios—all three factors implying
a rise in the capital formation proportions. For reasons just sug-
gested, the rise in the net capital formation proportion is likely to
be more pronounced on a relative basis, and sometimes even on an
absolute basis, than that in the gross.
Unfortunately, only the record for Sweden reaches back into the
period of rising capital formation proportions; and only the gross
proportion can be measured for those early decades, since the net
is derived by arbitrary assumptions (which probably underestimate
the true levels). But we may infer, by comparison with the current
situation in underdeveloped countries, that the period of rising
capital formation proportions marked the shift from the preindustrial
to the modern era in all the old countries and even in some of the
young, relatively "empty" countries settled by emigrants from the
Western European orbit (Canada and other former British do-
minions, if not necessarily the United States).
What the few long series do reflect are the high capital propor-
tion levels reached some time after the acceleration in the rate of
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growthoccurred; and the declines, usually gradual but sometimes
abrupt, from these levels. In the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, France, and Denmark the capital formation proportions
tend to decline—abrupfly in the United States and Denmark after
World War I. In Sweden they tend to rise during the first decades,
declining toward the end of the period covered. Also in the United
States and Canada the relative importance of depreciation increases,
as expected, and causes a greater decline in the net capital formation
proportion than in the gross. But the relation of the two series is
quite different in the United Kingdom, and we are at a loss to decide
whether it is because of some peculiarities of the estimating pro-
cedure or whether it reflects genuine differences in durable capital
consumption practices or in the composition of the total capital
stock.
One should note that, at least in the United States and Denmark,
there are indications of factors other than retardation in the rate of
growth of national product that explain the greater decline in the
net capital formation proportion than in the gross proportion. These
additional factors are the shortening of the average life of durable
capital, due largely to the more rapid growth of producers' equip-
ment than of construction, and the apparent increase in capacity to
turn Out more product with the same net stock of durable capital,
a decline in the ratio of net capital stock to output. The latter
trend may be explained in turn by the greater share of depreciation
associated with a decline in the rate of growth of product, since
"replacement" means substituting more effective equipment (even
when valued in constant prices); and the growth of the share of
"replacement" in total capital stock means growth of the propor-
tion in which constancy in value is accompanied by increased ef-
ficiency.
To sum up: The preceding comments suggest a long secular
swing in the capital formation proportion—its up phase occurring
presumably some time after the rise in the rates of growth of national
product and of population (in the older countries), and, perhaps,
also after that in the rate of growth of per capita product; and its
down phase emerging at different dates in different countries, and
with different degrees of abruptness associated with the disruptive
effects of wars and revolutions. The domestic capital formation pro-
portions rise to upper levels of about 25 per cent for gross and 15 per
cent for net (with lower ratios for the countries that channel much
of their savings abroad); and the rise in the net capital formation
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proportion isrelatively, and sometimes even absolutely, greater
than that in the gross, and it may well appear earlier in the record.
In the decline from the upper levels, the net capital formation pro-
portion drops more markedly than the gross, and possibly earlier.
Unfortunately, the data are not sufficient to permit us to outline this
secular swing effectively or to relate it properly to similar secular
swings in the growth of population and product.
2. Foreign Investment and
Total Capital Formation Proportions
THE LINKING OF FINANCING WITH CAPITAL FORMATION
We now consider the share of domestic capital formation financed
from foreign sources, and in this connection study also the propor-
tion of total capital formation (countrywide savings) to national
product. But before examining the data, we deal briefly with the
major difficulties in linking any source of financing with real capital
formation that must be recognized to avoid misinterpretation of the
estimates.
The basic problem is that, for any active economic agent, funds
from different sources are mingled in one pool out of which all
activities are financed. It is, therefore, essentially arbitrary to link
a specific category of funds with a specific type of use—in our case,
capital formation.
This difficulty can be discerned even in the case of a person who
borrows on mortgage, presumably to construct a house. On the
surface there is a clear and unequivocal link between a source of
finance and an item of real capital formation But closer examination
may reveal that the individual in question took a trip abroad in the
same year that he borrowed the money, and spent an amount out
of savings equal to his mortgage. He borrowed the money to build
a house rather than to go abroad because it was easier and more
"respectable" to borrow with a tangible asset as security. Can we say
unequivocally that in this case capital formation was financed by
borrowing rather than by savings?
If this difficulty emerges for a single economic agent, even when
there is a seeming connection between an act of financing arid an act
of capital formation, it is much greater for the broad groups we
must deal with in using the available data. The larger the group,
the greater the opportunity for intermingling both sources of funds
and types of uses. But this difficulty is seldom recognized. The
literature and data relating to international capital flows point out
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the influence of a complex of both political and economic conditions
on such flows but go on with misleading ease to estimate net changes
in them as a "share" of capital formation. To illustrate: Before
World War I, the Russian government borrowed heavily in inter-
national markets, primarily from France. Were data on real capital
formation in Russia available, it would be possible to compare its
net foreign borrowing with domestic capital formation and con-
clude that x per cent of the latter was "financed" from abroad. (In-
deed, these are the percentages and the comparisons that are given
in Appendix A.) But the Russian government may actually have
spent a good part of this borrowed money on police, on the organi-
zation of pogroms, and on the state church; and the direct financing
of capital formation may have been provided from other sources.
The assignment of capital funds imports to capital formation within
the country is thus arbitrary. To put it more precisely, it is based
on the implicit assumption that, given fluidity of funds, there is a
causal connection between sources of funds recognized as long-
term savings and uses of resources classified as additions to stocks
(i.e. capital formation). By and large, there is a closer association be-
tween capital funds and capital formation than between other funds
and capital formation: inability to secure capital funds would in-
hibit capital formation much sooner than it would consumption.
But this is a very broad association and subject to the qualification
that, for any specific group of capital funds, the links with capital
formation may be quite weak. In the present connection this quali-
fication should be stressed particularly when a government borrows
capital from a foreign country. For governments can obtain funds
on either a short- or a long-term basis for uses that have little
connection with capital formation, whereas individuals and private
firms must often show some evidence of use in terms of fixed assets
that may serve as security. Moreover, in foreign capital movements,
government borrowing is particularly subject to political considera-
tions that not only have little relation to capital.. formation, but in
a sense may be inversely related to it—as the experience of foreign
loans not only to Russia but to many other countries with govern-
ments inimical to economic progress testifies. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to analyze here the uses to which such loans were put or
to estimate the amounts that did finance capital formation within
the borrowing countries. The association between flow of funds and
capital formation must be made in broad terms for the larger ag-
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gregates for which data are available, with allowance for the quali-
fication just indicated.6
Two other qualifications must be indicated. The first flows from
the "netness" of the financing estimated in the available data. It is
almost never possible to measure the gross flow of funds cor-
responding to the gross capital turnover suggested in Section 1. Net
capital imports or exports—the only estimates we have for compari-
son with domestic capital formation—tend to understate greatly
the importance of the flows of goods and payments across boundaries.
Theoretically, it is possible to have zero or close to zero net capital
6 The argument set forth in this and the preceding paragraph can be clarified
in a restatement suggested by Moses Abramovitz, as follows:
1. In an economy in which commodity stocks are constant and savings posi-
tive, the net import of capital will simultaneously offset or "finance" all three of
the following differences as aggregates: (a) value of products or resources used
minus value of products produced domestically; (b) value of net additions to
capital stock minus net domestic savings; (c) value of imported goods and
services, including factor payments, minus value of exported goods and services,
including factor receipts. All this is implied by the usual definitions of national
income, saving, investment, and consumption.
2. Viewed as aggregates, therefore, capital imports do not finance capital
formation any more than they do consumption or imports of capital goods
or consumer goods. The securities against which capital is borrowed are not
significant because there is no uniform connection between the form in which
a loan is made and the use made of the proceeds. And even if it were true
that the proceeds of foreign loans were, in the first instance, expended to
purchase or produce capital, it would still be true that other resources would
thereby be released for non-investment purposes.
3. Nevertheless, there is good reason to compare net capital imports with
totalcapital formation. For when investment expenditures tend to exceed
domestic savings, a number of related processes are set in motion which tend
to close the investment-savings gap, some by increasing saving, but others
by inhibiting investment: (a) Real income and domestic real savings tend to
increase without a rise in prices. Insofar as this occurs, it implies the existence
of unemployed resources easily drawn into production. (b) Money prices,
money incomes, and money savings rise. In the course of this inflationary proc-
ess, domestic real savings also tend to increase as a result of various expenditure
lags and redistributions of income. (c) The domestic money market and the
domestic commodity markets get tighter. These developments tend to check
investment. (d) The tightness of the money market, however, is relieved to
the extent that foreigners are induced to hold claims against the home country.
The lightness of the commodity markets is relieved to the extent that an im-
port surplus is generated, which also increases the supply of claims to be
held by foreigners. In short, the check to investmentisrelieved to the
extent that capital imports are stimulated.
4. The volume of net capital imports in a period, therefore, represents an
unequivocal contribution to the increase in the supply of capital assets during
the period. It is only unequivocal, however, in the sense that capital imports
make some contribution. We cannot say how large the contribution is because
we do not know how much smaller the increase in capital would have been
in the absence of capital supplied from abroad.
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balances, with huge volumes of international goods and payments
flows. Large imports may not be possible without financing by
foreign sellers, or by the financial institutions servicing them. Large
exports may not be possible without financing by the domestic
sellers or their financial institutions. But the destination of exports
and the identity of the beneficiaries of domestic financing may be
quite different from the origin of imports and the identity of the
foreign creditor. It may well be that if the selling countries are not
willing to finance imports, a given country cannot enjoy either the
imports or the contribution which they may make to capital forma-
tion and growth. Of course, this is a corollary of the statement made
earlier that "net" totals reveal neither the underlying flows and
counterfiows nor the importance of this mechanism to the processes
of capital formation and economic growth. But it is particularly
appropriate in connection with net capital imports and exports be-
cause there are so many opportunities for diverse flows and con-
siderable offsetting in the position of any country vis-à-vis the rest
of the world.
The second qualification relates to the use of total debt outstand-
ing, either domestic or foreign, gross(i.e. with both debt and
counterclaims shown separately) or net. In using such data to esti-
mate the relative importance of the corresponding source of funds
in financing past capital formation, we face a problem, because debts
may be revalued through default or cancellation; and the face or
market value of the debt at any given time may not reflect the
actual magnitude of funds made available at the time the loans were
made and the securities issued. Furthermore, even if there are no
defaults, no sales of original debt issues at less than face value, etc.,
a cumulative total of capital formation makes sense only after its
several parts have been reduced to a common price level; and that
can be done if the shares per time unit of real capital formation are
reflected in the data or if the total of tangible assets is revalued
periodically, with the changes in bases of valuations inferred from
changes in price levels. For the cumulative total of debt, no general
deflation is possible: the estimates of gross and net debt issues at
successive dates are indispensable. It is for this reason that the
cumulative debt totals are used sparingly in the following discussion
and primarily to indicate the geographical distribution of interna-
tional capital lending.
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THE EVIDENCE ON CAPITAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
In Tables 11-1 to 11-4 net capital imports or exports are shown as
shares of net domestic capital formation, gross domestic capital
formation, net national product, and gross national product. The
numerator is net after capital inflows and outflows have been bal-
anced out. For some countries and periods estimates of both inflows
and outflows are available. It may seem illogical to compare a net
capitalmovement with gross totals; and it is true that, theoretically,
part of capital consumption, which enters gross capital formation and
gross national product, must be credited to the foreign owners of
capital and debited to domestic users. But in fact additions to domes-
tic depreciation reserves or replacements of domestic capital do not
add to the claims of foreign owners; and it is reasonable to include
among the possible sources of financing of domestic gross capital
formation the total depreciation charge, net domestic savings, and
net capital imports.
The evidence on the shares of foreign investment in domestic
capital formation and in national product conveys the following
impressions:
1. Both net and gross domestic capital formation are sensitive to
short-term changes; and the former, particularly, can drop to zero
or a negative quantity in a depressed year. Hence, a fraction in which
capital formation is the denominator can be quite erratic when
calculated for a single year or a short period. For this reason the
evidence in Table 11-1, which relates to a single year and to the
exceptional post-World War II period, is only of limited value. We
must rely primarily on Tables 11-2 and 11-4, particularly the latter.
These tables show that for some creditor and some debtor coun-
tries the proportions of capital exports or imports to domestic
capital formation were quite substantial. In the United Kingdom
the share of net capital exports in domestic net capital formation
ranged from about a third to over nine-tenths, depending upon the
estimate and particularly the period; and the share in domestic gross
capital formation ranged from about a fifth to three-quarters. In
France, the other major creditor country, the share of capital exports
in domestic net savings ranged from a sixth to three-quarters. In
the Netherlands the data for the 1920's alone show that the share of
capital exports was about a seventh of net domestic capital forma-
tion and about a tenth of gross, and the shares may have been ap-
preciably higher before World War I. For some debtor countries
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also,the shares of capital imports in domestic capital formation were
fairly substantial in the long run. In Sweden, in the early decades,
the share of capital imports in domestic net capital formation ranged
from a fifth to eight-tenths, and their share in gross from about a
ninth to less than half (Table 11-4, C); in Canada the share of
capital imports in domestic net capital formation was close to a
half in 1900-1920, and the share in gross from a quarter to a third
(Table 11-4, D); in Denmark, capital imports at their highest
accounted for over a quarter of domestic net capital formation and
about a sixth of gross, and for 1870-1904 were about a fifth of the
former and less than a seventh of the latter (Table 11-4, F). On the
other hand, in the United States, capital imports did not account for
sizable proportions of domestic capital formation (Table 11-4, A).
And, as will be indicated below, there is reason to suspect that the
available data, because of a bias in their selection, tend to exaggerate
the relative importance of capital imports and exports.
2. As indicated above, the long-term proportions of domestic net
and gross capital formation to national product vary within moderate
limits—from somewhat less than 5 to about 15 per cent for the
former, and from somewhat less than 10 to about 25 per cent for
the latter. Since capital imports and exports are in turn fractions of
domestic capital formation, their long-term share in national product
is small. In the 1920's, capital imports and exports ranged from less
than 1 to about 2 per cent of, national product (Table 11-2). In the
interwar period, i.e. from about 1921 to 1938, capital imports and
exports ranged from less than 1 to about 2.5 per cent of national
income (Table 11-3). In the longer records in Table 11-4, about
the highest ratios shown are 6 to 7 per cent for capital exports in
the United Kingdom in the decade before World War I, and over
9 per cent for capital imports in Canada in 1901-1910. But most
shares in national income or gross national product are well below
5 per cent.
It should be stressed that there is no arithmetical necessity for a
low ratio of capital imports or exports to either domestic capital
formation or national product. Theoretically, a country could have
net capital exports substantially in excess of its domestic capital
formation or could import, in the long run, capital not only equal
to but in excess of its domestic capital formation (implying domestic
consumption larger than net national product). It is economic and
related factors that limit the volume of capital movements across the
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boundaries to fractions of domestic capital formation and to still
smaller fractions of national product.
3. The fact that the available records exaggerate the relative im-
portance of international capital flows, when viewed against the larger
canvas of the world economy, is a natural reflection of the correlation
between the importance of such capital movements and the effort to
collect data about them. These long-term records are either for the
most prominent internationalcreditor countries(England and
France) or for the most prominent international debtor countries, in
the sense that the importance of capital imports was greatest for
them (Canada, Sweden, and Australia). Of the creditor countries
omitted from the records, only the Netherlands, and only for limited
periods, might have shown proportions of capital exports to domestic
capital formation and national product as high as those for the
United Kingdom; and of the debtor countries omitted, only Argen-
tina, New Zealand, and perhaps one or two others might have
shown proportions of capital imports to domestic capital formation
and national product as high as those for Canada, Sweden, and
Australia. Other missing creditor countries,e.g. Germany and
Switzerland, would probably have shown much lower proportions of
capital exports to domestic capital formation and national product
than the United Kingdom and France.7 Among the debtor countries
the larger units, e.g. the United States and Japan, enjoyed capital
imports that were only minor fractions of domestic capital forma-
tion and minute percentages of national product. In most of the
debtor countries of any size not covered by the record, the share of
capital imports—not necessarily in net capital formation but in gross
and particularly in national product—must have been quite low
indeed.
Another interesting aspect of the long-term record is its concen-
tration on a period when, judging by the scanty data available for
earlier and later decades, the relative importance of international
capital movements may have been at its highest. From 1870 to 1914,
Herbert Feis comments on Germany: "In some periods, the early seventies
and middle eighties in particular, more than one-tenth, perhaps as much as
one-fifth of the savings of the country made a choice of foreign employment.
But that movement did not grow with the volume of savings in the nineties
and after the turn of the century. From 1900 to 1914 less than one-tenth,
rather than more, of current savings went abroad despite the appeal of un-
developed lands, the exertion of the Government in behalf of foreign enter-
prise, the great growth of the overseas banking system and commerce." Europe,
theWorld'r Banker, 1870-1914, Yale University Press, 19S0, pp. 61-62. Quoted
by permission.
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particularly in the twenty years preceding the outbreak of World
War I, both the phase of development of the creditor countries and in-
ternational conditions seem to have been most favorable to capital ex-
ports; and the demand for foreign capital by potentially suitable debtor
countries seems to have been at its strongest. At any rate, the three
major creditor countries—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany
—were at the height of their international lending power between
1870 and 1914; and the conditions of the would-be borrowing coun-
tries—the dominions of the British Empire, the United States, Japan,
and a few Latin-American countries—warranted demand for foreign
capital. The summary of the long-term record in Table 11-4 is thus
largely for a limited period in which the importance of international
capital movement may have been greater, in relative terms, than
either in the preceding or in the following decades.8
4. These comments suggest that international indebtedness in
1914 was the result of capital imports and exports during a period
that, historically speaking, was most favorable to international capital
movements. The picture, presented in International Capital Move-
ments during the Inter-War Period,9 can be introduced by a brief
quotation from that source: "The chief capital exporting countries
before World War I were the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
At the outbreak of the war, their foreign long-term investments
represented about three-fourths of all outstanding international in-
vestments. Over a period of forty years—from 1874 to 1914—the
foreign long-term investments of these three countries had grown
from $6,000 million to $83,000 million. Available information sug-
gests that the total of their combined capital exports during this
period slightly exceeded the difference of $27,000 million between
the two estimates. Losses due to defaults and bankruptcies, par-
ticularly during the period of falling prices before the mid-1890's,
8 Total international capital indebtedness in the early 1930's was higher than
in 1918 or 1914. But this was shortly after the crest of the large capital move-
ments of the 1920's. Table 11-8 indicates that a reverse flow, from the debtor
to the creditor countries, took place during the 1930's. While total international
indebtedness at the end of the 1930's may have still been absolutely higher than
in 1914, itis highly unlikely that its proportions to the volumes of output
in current prices and to the world total of capital formation at the end of the
1930's were equal to those in 1918-1914. I am strongly inclined to believe
that the relative importance of international capital was at a peak in the 1910-
1913 period, and that the share of international indebtedness in the total of
world real capital was significantly higher in 1918 than at any previous or
subsequent time within the last two centuries.
° United Nations, October 1949. Quotation is from page 1.
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and the probable net increase in short-term credits granted may ex-
plain this fact."
Total international long-term debt in 1913/1914 was estimated to
be $44 billion, including $3.5 billion in gross credits for the United
States (ibid., p. 2). Excluding the latter, the sum of net credits of
creditor countries amounted to $40.5 billion. In mid-1932, interna-
tional debts (including political) were estimated by Julius Hirsch
to be about 307 billion German marks, of which 55 billion were
short-term.'° Assuming that short-term indebtedness was the same
proportion of long-term in 1913/1914 as in 1932, which may be an
overestimate, we add about a fifth to $40.5 billion and get a grand
total of about $49 billion for total international debt. This was the
cumulative result of international capital investments over a period of
at least half a century when the movement was at its height.
The relative size of this total depends upon the base with which
one compares it. In 1912 the value, in current prices, of total re-
producible wealth in one debtor country alone, the United States,
was $94 billion.11 The annual rate of net capital exports was well
below $1 billion per year for the preceding half century. (Much of
this, of course, was advanced when money had a higher purchasing
power than in 1914.) The annual rate of domestic gross capital
formation in the United States alone was, in current prices, over $3
billion from 1869 to 1914; and its national product close to $15
billion per year on the average. It is impossible to estimate the world
product and capital formation over the same period; but it seems
reasonable to guess that international capital movements even at
their height accounted for only a limited fraction of world gross
capital formation and a minor fraction of total world output.'2
10 Carl Iversen, Aspects of the Theory of international Capital Movements,
London, Oxford, 1935, pp. 336-337.
ii income and Wealth, Series II, Simon Kuznets, editor, Cambridge, Eng.,
Bowes & Bowes for International Association for Research in Income and
Wealth, 1952, Table 1, p. 306.
12 During the period under discussion, the net capital exports were just
about equal to, or not much in excess of, the income on the outstanding foreign
investments. In other words, the net additions can be viewed as retention by
the debtor countries of the income earned by investments extant at the be-
ginning of each period, although, of course, funds did shift and specific
debtor countries did not necessarily "retain" their earnings on borrowed capital.
In this connection we quote from the United Nations report already cited:
"While the growth in the investments of the three (major creditor) countries
was not uniform, it was steady and, considering the three countries together,
appears to have been close to the yield (interest, dividends and profits) of the
investments. Over the entire period (i.e. from 1874 to 1914), the total of
the estimated capital exports from the three countries practically equalled their
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In addition to these limitations upon relative size, there was also
the peculiar distribution of capital exports. Table 11-5 shows the
geographical distribution of foreign investments by the three main
creditor countries on the eve of World War I. Political factors seem
to have weighed heavily in determining the distribution. Of the total
foreign investment by the United Kingdom, almost half was in the
Empire, the largest amounts in Canada and Australia; another fifth
was in the United States; and only about 5 per cent was in Asia and
Africa, outside of the Empire. Of French foreign investment, about
half—in Russia, Turkey, the Balkan states, Austria-Hungary, and the
colonies—was dominated by political considerations. Of German for-
eign investment, the politically motivated share—going to Austria-
Hungary, Turkey, Russia, and the Balkan states—was over a third.
One could naïvely argue that, even from the viewpoint of a man
living at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
century, a rationally conceived distribution of foreign investments
would certainly have allocated larger shares to the United States, to
the English-speaking colonies, to many European countries, to Japan,
and to selected Latin-American countries. The rationale of large
capital flows to Russia, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans,
in view of their shaky governmental and social structures, was cer-
tainly not economic. The point is that no matter what limited inter-
national capital funds were available, only part flowed into the
channels of warranted economic demand for capital formation.
5. We cannot adequately explain here why financing of capital
formation out of foreign funds was so restricted in scope, even under
the exceptionally favorable conditions of the half century from the
1870's to World War I. But we can say that among the forces at
play, those that should be emphasized are the following: the factors
that limited the proportional magnitude of savings in all countries,
even in those sufficiently advanced economically to be potential
capital exporters; the draft upon such savings for domestic capital
formation, to provide houses for the growing population and capital
to operate the domestic economy; and the general limitation of the
horizon of the entrepreneur or the investing institution, which made
aggregate income from the investments. The average annual income—at least
towards the end of the period—was about 5percent....'Financial'payments
(capital yields and capital movements) tended to offset each other in the
balance of payments of the countries, taken as a group, that were creditors
on balance, and accordingly also in those which, on balance, were debtors"
(p. 1).
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domestic placement of funds seem preferable to the troubles and
uncertainties of investment in foreign places. The limited domestic
savings and the minimum demand for domestic capital formation
probably explain in large part the small number of net capital
creditor countries. For some of these, e.g. France, post facto analysis
suggests that savings became available for foreign use because of
limitations upon domestic investment and peculiaritiesof the
methods of financial institutions for the mobilization and placement
of savings, rather than because of any excess of domestic savings
over investment opportunities at home. The latter might have de-
veloped with more dynamic entrepreneurial leadership and a better
organization of apparatus for domestic financing.' Since in most
countries, particularly those economically developed, the social order
kept consumption growing pan passu with national output and
hence kept the domestic savings proportion down, and since there
was a minimum need for domestic capital formation, there were
obvious limits to the total net volume of capital exports that these
leading countries could generate.
True, there were factors that limited demand also. In most coun-
tries, political and social conditions were hardly conducive to the
absorption of large, long-term capital imports. In these countries,
economically warranteddemandwas quite limited because the po-
litical and social situation was not stable—again from the viewpoint
of intelligent contemporaries.
Yet it can be argued that the limitations on demand were far less
important than those on supply. By and large, the absorptive capacity
of the United States and Canada and of other countries with rela-
tively stable political and social systems and considerable opportuni-
ties for growth (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and some Latin-
American countries) would seem to have been quite sufficient to
employ all the capital exports generated by the creditor countries,
and probably much more. This rough judgment is supported by
the rapid growth in the absolute volume of capital formation in
these countries and their obvious capacity to sustain a much larger
volume of payments on their international indebtedness than they
actually made. To put it briefly, if perhaps too drastically: prior to
World War I the volume of international capital exports was re-
stricted primarily because the nupplq of savings available was 'Seethe stimulating discussion in Harry D. White's The French Interna-
tionalAccounts,1880-1913,Harvard University Press, 1983, particularly Chaps.
xu and xiii.
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limited. The situation may have changed significantly after World
War I: during recent decades the limitations on the economically
warranted demand for foreign capital have become more prominent,
whereas, with the emergence of the United States as a potential
net creditor, the limitations on the capacity to lend have become
less conspicuous.
6. In the United Kingdom and France there appears to have been
a rise in the proportionate importance of capital exports until the
two decades before World War I. But with this war came a major
break for both of these creditor countries and for Germany too.
During the interwar period they recovered somewhat, only to suffer
a more drastic collapse during World War II. This picture of the
culmination in 1914 of the development of international capital flows,
and of the sharp breaks thereafter, only strengthens the impression of
the extent to which the whole network was shot through withpo-
litical aspects, so that a change in the latter could produce so sharp
and complete a reversal.
In the debtor countries capital imports tend to become less im-
portant as time passes and the country grows; and this trend is
sharply accentuated by war whenever the debtor country is outside
the area of armed conflict. In Sweden, Canada, Germany, the United
States, and Australia there is a clear downward trend in the share
of capital imports, pointing toward an eventual reversal of theirpo-
sitions from debtor to creditor nations. If data were available for the
earlier decades of the nineteenth century, we would probably have
found a similar process operating in some of the older European
countries. We would have seen them starting as international debtors
and becoming creditors by the last half or quarter of the nineteenth
century.
Because of the emphasis placed on the limited magnitude of capi-
tal impprts and exports and on the factors that may have caused this
restriction, it may be well to repeat the qualifications on the signifi-
cance of these measures. These are net balances and hence limited
in size, and one should not infer that their significance in the de-
velopment of the various countries has been correspondingly limited.
The composition of foreign security and asset holdings is never
the same as that of domestic security and asset holdings. The
foreign investors are able to, and often do, support or complement
the domestic capital market where it is weak and where, therefore,
the cost of finance might become impossibly high without a foreign
contribution. For several countries—primarily the smaller ones with-
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in the economic orbit of such large capital exporters as the United
Kingdom, and to some extent those within the economic orbit of
France—favored by political conditions, the import of such capital
was of decisive significance in development. Even for the large
capital-importing countries (the United States and Japan and earlier
in the nineteenth century France and Germany) the receipt of
goods from the economically advanced areas, financed in part by
loans, provided opportunities for economic growth and prevented
internal strains that might otherwise have developed. Granted the
relative smallness of the share that outside funds contributed to the
financing of capital formation in such large countries, the very
possibility of extensive economic intercourse with the more de-
veloped economies was significant; and the net capital imports that
were received were all the more valuable because they. were a
small balance of a much larger gross flow. It may well be that the
satisfactory economic growth of underdeveloped countries of any
size depends in part upon a combination of relatively small capital
imports associated with much larger gross flows of commodities and
services to and from developed countries. We cannot dismiss the
suggestion that although the past record for the large debtor and
would-be debtor countries shows relatively insignificant net capital
imports, the process of which these imports were the net result was
an important factor in economic growth. This statement has obvious
bearing upon current discussion of the needs of underdeveloped
countries for capital imports: however acute such needs may seem,
the need for larger gross flows of commodities and services across
the boundaries may be greater.
THE TOTAL CAPITAL FORMATION (SAVINGS) PROPORTION
By adding the share of capital imports or exports in national
product to the share of domestic capital formation, we get the share
of total capital formation, or of countrywide savings, in total na-
tional product. From the estimates given in Tables lI-i, 11-2, and
11-4, three major conclusions can be reached. First, for the coun-
tries covered, which are primarily developed or semideveloped
economies (although there are a few underdeveloped countries in
Table 11-1), the shares of net savings in net national product vary
from somewhat over 5toabout 15 per cent. The corresponding range•
for the shares of gross savings in gross national product is from
somewhat over 10 to about 25 per cent. In both cases the limits are
close to those observed for the shares of net and gross domestic
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capitalformation. The estimates for several countries omit net
changes in inventories and thus understate the proportion of sav-
ings. But the adjustment for this omission is slight and would not
significantly affect the limits stated.
Second, at least within the range of countries covered, a larger
per capita income is not consistently accompanied by a larger pro-
portion of long-term net capital formation or savings to national
product. The United States and Canada have the highest per capita
income. Yet in Table 11-2 the Netherlands shows a distinctly higher
ratio of net capital formation to product (17.4 per cent) than the
United States (12.7 per cent). In Table 11-1 the net capital forma-
tion proportions for the United States and Canada, for the post-
World War II period, are 13.5 per cent and 15.2 per cent respec-
tively. Finland, Australia, and New Zealand all have higher propor-
tions than the United States.If we could include the major
underdeveloped countries, which presumably have low net capital
formation proportions, the positive association between the levels
of per capita income and the savings-income proportion might
be raised. Nevertheless, it is significant that the correlation between
the per capita income and the savings-income ratio is not likely to
be high, even if it is positive, when countries with low per capita
incomes are excluded. Cross-section comparisons of the level of
income and the savings proportions among countries are thus not
likely to show as close a positive correlation as would similar com-
parisons among income groups within each country.
Third, the long-term records for several countries in Table 11-4
reveal that secular rises in per capita income are not accompanied
by rises in the proportion of net capital formation or savings to na-
tional product. In the United States, Canada, and Denmark the
proportion either declines slightly or is stable throughout. In Sweden
it rises until the second decade of the twentieth century, but then
declines. In other words, the relation over the long period between
the, movements of income and of the savings-income ratio is quite
different from that observed in cross-section analysis between levels
of income and the proportion of savings to income within a country.
The possible reasons for the limits set to the long-term savings-
income proportion and for the failure of that proportion to rise with
the secular rise in real income per capita have already been dis-
cussed, in reference to the experience of the United States.4 But 'SimonKuznets, "Proportion of Capital Formation to National Product,"
American Economic Review, Proceedings, May 1952, pp. 508-526, particularly
pp. 509-513 and 521-524.
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we list here again the major factors involved because they may shed
some light on differences in the savings-income ratio among de-
veloped and underdeveloped countries, and among the several
phases in the growth of the developed countries. Also, further
thought suggests the need for reformulating some of the earlier
analysis of the "rational" savings of lower income groups.
The savings-income proportion of individuals is the main de-
terminant of the ratio of net savings to net product—particularly in
countries organized under the business system. In these countries,
because the economic role of governments is, by definition, fairly
well circumscribed, financing by governments of capital formation
out of taxes or other levies is quite limited except in war years. For
obvious reasons the legislative bodies will not permit the use of the
compulsory apparatus of taxation to finance capital formation, except
for distinctly specified and well-defined purposes; nor will they per-
mit the executive branches to accumulate reserves that might finance
capital formation independently of the periodic appropriation power
of legislatures. Likewise, organized business enterprises, corporate
or individual, can contribute relatively little to the net savings of
the country because they are always under pressure to distribute a
large fraction of their net earnings, and their earnings are, in the
long run, a fairly limited fraction of the total net output of the na-
tion. In the United States, for example, in "normal" periods, when
government's capacity for net capital formation out of revenues
was at its peak, its share in net country-wide savings was about a
seventh; that of corporations and other, business enterprises was
about a quarter; and that of individuals was at least six-tenths of
country-wide net savings. There is no reason to assume that in other
business economies the proportionate importance of individuals'
savings in the total of• domestic savings is much lower. The major
source of the limitation of the country-wide savings-product propor-
tion therefore lies in the limits to the long-term level of the savings-
income ratio for, individuals.
The long-term savings-income proportion for individuals is re-
stricted partly by factors that operate to keep down the share of
total income received by the upper income groups—the "automatic"
savers—and partly by those that limit the savings-income proportion
for the masses of income recipients whose savings represent an
effort that has to be planned on some rational considerations gov-
erning the distribution of limited income between consumption and
provision for the future.
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Ineconomies that enjoy satisfactory rates of growth, the very
dynamics of the growth process holds down the relative proportion
of income received by the upper income groups. If we allow for no
shifting and assume continuity of an initial top group (and its de-
scendants), that group's share in country-wide income is likely to
be kept down by a lower than country-wide rate of growth of serv-
ice income per capita; and because of a lower rate o increase in
number, the initial top group and its descendants will form, as time
passes, a declining proportion of the given ordinal top group in the
population. If we allow for the shifting which necessarily accompa-
nies significant economic growth and follows from changes in the
identity of industries and occupations that are growing most rapidly,
we find that the identity of entrepreneurs and of others who enjoy
large incomes changes from one period to the next. Such shifts in
identity mean that the captains of industry, the successful practi-
tioners of rapidly growing professions or arts, the millionaires of
today, are not likely to be those of tomorrow; nor are the latter likely
to be the sons of the former. This mobility prevents the cumulation
of successive large gains by one group of individuals and tends to
hold down the inequality in the distribution of assets and incomes.15
For the mass of income recipients, whose savings must be based
upon a rational weighing of future security against current con-
sumption, the limit to the savings-income ratio is imposed by this
very balancing of the present versus the future. In the paper cited
above, illustrative examples were given based on the assumption of
a perpetual annuity yielding a consumption level upon retirement
equal to half that during the twenty-five years (out of a forty-year
working life) when positive savings would be made. These illus-
trations suggest that provision of such security calls for a savings-
income ratio of from 8 to 20 per cent over the period of working and
earning life, depending upon the assumed interest yield on savings.
If we add the incomes of the retired (their savings are zero), the
nationwide savings-income ratio is even lower—how much lower de-
pends upon the proportion of retired to active income recipients
and the assumed difference in their incomes.
Another simplified model worth exploring calls for enough savings
to cover living expenses for the years of retirement. If annual ex-
penses per unit are assumed to be the same for the working and
retirement periods, the savings-income ratio is equal to the ratio
15 For an exploration of the factors affecting level and trends in shares of
upper income groups see Appendix C.
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between years of retirement and years of work and retirement. Thus
if working life is set at 45 years, and the retirement period at 15,
total income earned in 45 years must be spent in 60 years, and the
implied savings-income ratio for each unit through its working life
is 33 per cent of income. If the number of working units is three
times the number of units retired, the nationwide savings for the
two groups combined are zero, since the gross savings of the work-
ing units are fully offset by the dissavings of the retired. But with
a growing population the ratio of working population to the retired
is larger than the ratio of years of work to years of retirement.
Furthermore, the estimated years of retirement, underlying these
full security calculations, is probably nearer the maximum than th
average; and actual realized dissavings by the surviving retired class
would thus be significantly less than those implied in the calcula-
tion. Another qualifying element is provision for an estate at death,
although for the mass of income recipients this is not a major con-
sideration. These comments suggest that savings-income ratios for
the mass of income recipients are largely governed by the effects
of population growth on the ratio of working units to retired, by the
effects of growth in per capita income on the lag in expenditures
of retired persons behind those of the younger and still active in-
come recipients, and by the possible overestimate of the length of
the retirement period. If all these considerations are valid, the
savings-income ratio for the group of income recipients below the
level of the "automatic" savers is not likely to be high.16
The two groups of factors just discussed may operate differently
in underdeveloped countries. Inequality in the distribution of income
may well be greater than in the developed countries, particularly
those that grew rapidly in the period under observation (e.g. the
United States, Canada, Australia, and Sweden). All other conditions
being equal, this inequality would tend to yield a higher savings-
income ratio. On the other hand, in the underdeveloped countries
greater stability in the composition of upper income groups makes
for a higher relative consumption level for the rich; the per capita
income of the mass of the population is quite low; the rate of popu-
lation growth, and hence the excess of possible savers over dissavers,
is much smaller; and most important, under the family system that
predominates, the older generation is supported directly by the
younger. While in and of itself, the large family system theoretically
16InAppendix D, I have attempted to explore the implications of this
model.
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shouldnot affect the relative volume of real savings in the economy,
in practice it tends to "invest" any surplus resources in the younger
generation rather than in some form of "capital formation" that can
be entered in our statistical tables. Thus the savings for the mass
of the population in the underdeveloped countries are likely to be
much lower than in developed countries—even relative to income.
Indeed, in these countries savings of groups below the top are proba-
bly close to zero and perhaps often negative. The depressing effects
of factors determining savings of the mass of income recipients may
well outweigh significantly the raising effects of the greater in-
equality in the size distribution of income. A large part of the
savings of the upper income groups may therefore be offset by dis-
savings of the lower income groups, causing even greater inequality
in the distribution of assets and income unless some other major
factors intervene.
The savings-income ratios are somewhat higher—at least when re-
lated to per capita income—in the older developed countries (e.g.
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom before World War I)
than in the more rapidly growing and socially fluid countries (e.g.
the United States and Australia). This difference may be due to
a greater inequality in the size distribution of income in the former
countries as well as a lesser internal economic mobility.
The comments above bear upon. the level of the aggregate sav-
ings-income share, but the factors stressed concern only indirectly
the long-term trend of such shares over time. The main factors
operative in the latter connection are the ones that shape con-
sumer responses to rises in income levels, factors which in a free
and fluid society exercise pressure toward higher consumption levels.
With such pressures upon the mass of income recipients, as well
as upon most of the upper groups; with institutional changes that
tend to reduce the saving propensities—urbanization, lessening im-
portance of the individual entrepreneur, and the like—stability or
even a slight decline in the savings-income proportion for individ-
uals in the developed countries is hardly surprising. In recent dec-
ades egalitarian economic legislation, by reducing the share of the
"automatic" savers, may also have influenced this movement. Im-
plicit in our definition of an economy under the aegis of business
enterprises are the freedom and, in a sense, the sovereignty of the
ultimate consumer. It is the consumer's response to the technological
changes accompanying economic growth that brings about higher
levels of possible material enjoyment. It is the pacesetter in the
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continuous race between the rise in per capita consumption and the
rise in per capita output—in which the former is not necessarily the
loser.
3. Types of Capital Formation Financing
The various ways in which capital formation is financed are
obviously important in that they determine its magnitude and
structure. In some cases the stock of capital goods used by the
productive enterprise is increased by the user's own efforts, e.g. a
farmer who hacks out and sets up fence posts barters labor for
capital. In other cases money savings are used to "finance" the
acquisition of a capital good. If savings are used, the purchaser,
whether an individual or a business firm, may finance the acquisi-
tion out of his own funds or may seek external sources of financing.
If external financing is provided, it may take the form of a privately
arranged loan between individuals or of an issue of debt or equity
securities on the public investment markets, or it may involve the
use of bank credit. Furthermore, external financing may be ar-
ranged either directly by the owner of funds or through an inter-
mediate financial institution (insurance company, bank, building
and loan association, etc.) to which the owner of funds has dele-
gated responsibility for placement and management of his assets.
Finally, savings motivated by security may finance only conservative
investment whereas other savings may be available for venture
capital financing.
Of the five dichotomies of financing suggested—money and barter,
external and internal, private and public, immediate and inter-
mediate, security and venture—some are interrelated. Obviously,
barter financing as defined here can be only internal. Likewise, in-
ternal financing can be only private since it takes place within the
confines of the capital-user unit. External financing, on the other
hand, can be either private or public, immediate or intermediate.
And both external and internal financing may be security- or venture-
motivated. It is hardly nçcessary to dwell on these taxonomic nice-
ties. But it is necessary to understand that these distinctions are im-
portant to the functional relation between savings, capital formation,
and economic growth. Clearly, the forms of financing that function
most efficiently are those that can channel savings to effect the
maximum volume of real capital formation that has a structure most
conducive to increased productivity of the economy. The extent to
which savings flow freely or are restricted by their owners or the
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intermediaryagents who handle them and the extent to which they
are directed toward the venturesome rather than the more secure
uses have great bearing on the contribution of capital formation to
economic growth.
Most of the distinctions apply equally to the financing of capital
imports and exports and of domestic capital. For the former, how-
ever, they cannot be used profitably because there are almost no
data on the various sources of financing capital flows across bound-
aries and, more important, because these flows are, in large part,
dictated by political considerations. We therefore omit foreign
financing of domestic capital formation and confine the discussion of
types of financing to domestic sources of savings, relating them to
totalnetand gross capital formation (the equivalents of net and
gross domestic savings).
But even for total capital formation and its counterpart, country-
wide domestic savings, discussion of trends in types of financing
must be conjectural for the most part. The one study I know of con-
taining data from which long-term trends in various types of savings
and financing can be derived is a recent one for the United States
by Raymond W. Goldsmith.17 The scattered data for some countries
for recent years in the national accounts tables cover too short a
period to be instructive and are often distorted by peculiarities of
definition, particularly of government and corporate savings. Even
Goldsmith's record for the United States (Table III), which covers
over half a century, is so affected by war and postwar conditions that
it does not reveal any clear-cut long-term trends.
As a poor substitute for the missing substantive findings we pre-
sent several conclusions reached after reflection on the possible
trends in the relative importance of various types of capital forma-
tion financing in developed countries with business systems. These
conjectures—that is actually, all they are—we attempt to keep within
reasonable bounds by referring to the main institutional features of
economic growth in these countries.
1. To measure capital formation produced within an enterprise by
its own forces is difficult, if not impossible. Although we have no
estimates for this type of activity—classified here as "barter financ-
ing"—we cannot deny that it is widespread wherever individually
operated, small-scale agriculture or handicrafts prevail. In growing
countries which expanded over what was virtually virgin territory
(e.g. the United States, Canada, Australia, and many Latin-Amer-
17Goldsmith,op. cit.
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ican countries) this type of net capital formation may have been
quite large during the period of extensive expansion, both absolutely
and relative to total capital formation. In the older underdeveloped
countries, where agriculture still plays a dominant part, the mainte-.
nance of capital, and therefore barter financing of grosscapital
formation at least, may also be substantial.
It follows that in the developed countries the trend in the share
of barter financing in total capital formation, gross or net, must
definitely have been downward after extensive expansion had slowed
down or come to an end, and after the relative shares of agricul-
ture and other industries somewhat removed from the complex net-
work of the money and credit system had declined. Moreover, the
share of barter-financed capital formation in gross, and perhaps also
in net, capital formation is probably much higher in underdeveloped
than in developed countries.
2. Theoretically, barter can also be used for external financing,
but this type of financing would hardly be significant. We can there-
fore assume that external financing can emerge only with the help
of money and similar means for systematic and extended transactions
among different economic units.
But if flow of money and money funds are the precondition of
external financing, their very fluidity creates difficulty in properly
identifying and distinguishing external and internal financing. As
already indicated, to link .a specific source of funds with a specific
use is purely arbitrary. Thus even if, for a single enterprise, both
the depreciation reserves and gross value of physical assets accounts
show offsetting changes, it does not follow that an item of durable
capital equipment was internally financed. In the actual transaction,
the capital goods seller may have advanced credit to the finn, but
the latter may have used it in turn to finance some of its customers.
Only by the convention of association of long-term sources with long-
lived capital can we decide that internal financing was used in this
instance.
A more important point, particularly for statistical measurement,
is that "internality" and "externality" are relative concepts. In the
above example the question was whether financing was internal for
the given firm. However, what is external to a finn may be internal
to an aggregate for an industry, and what is external to an industry
may be internal to a broader aggregate, and so on. For a country
as a whole, only foreign sources are external; all other financing of
capital formation is, by definition, internal. And for the world as
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a whole there can be no external financing. The basic unit used to
determine internal and external financing must, therefore, be clearly
stated before the differences can be discussed. For our purposes
this unit is the ultimate smallest ownership unit using a specific
capital good. Thus a man borrowing funds to build a house for
himself is, to the extent of the loan, receiving "external" financing,
although the lender may be another individual and although for
individuals as a whole this transaction is internal. Likewise, a firm
whose accumulated depreciation reserves are used by another firm
in the same industry is treated as a lender, engaged in "external"
financing. The important distinction between external and internal
financing is not that the former involves, and the latter does not
involve, extensive operations by financial institutions. (A person
financing his own house internally may still need to call upon scores
of financial institutions to honor his checks or claims.) The difference
is rather that with internal financing the prospective user of the
capital good can make all necessary decisions, whereas with ex-
ternal financing the approval of the lender must be obtained.
In conjecturing about the long-term trends in the distribution be-
tween internal and external financing, the residential housing com-
ponent of capital formation must be distinguished from the other
major component, business capital. For residential and related hous-
ing in the United States, there is some evidence that the share of
external financing rose in the long run, say since the 1870's and even
since the 1900's, and that, correspondingly, the share of internal
financing declined. These trends are observed in both net and gross
additions to the stock of housing. The chief reason for these move-
ments is obvious: in the earlier decades facilities for external financ-
ing were, if not absent, so limited that individuals could not easily
get long-term credit to finance the construction or purchase of
homes; but with the development of financing facilities this situa-
tion was eased and credit was extended more readily. Offhand, I
would expect that a similar trend developed in countries whose
growth was not unlike that of the United States, e.g. Canada and
perhaps Australia. For other countries I hesitate even to guess.
The trends in the financing of business capital formation may well
have been different. In the early decades of the nineteenth century,
before the corporate form of organization had begun to develop and
before security markets with broad coverage had been established,
much of the financing must have been internal. At any rate, it is
difficult to envisage as large a proportion of external financing in the
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early decades as in the later years, which saw the development of
modern methods for mobilizing large amounts of small savings and
channeling them to the major capital-using enterprises. It was
largely the railroads and, later, the other public utilities that pro-
vided the schools in which the methods of widespread external
financing were learned (with some simpler lessons gleaned from
the building of canals and turnpikes). Our supposition is, then,
that the share of external financing in both net and gross business
capital formation showed a secular rise, generally from the second
to the last quarter of the nineteenth century (with some differences
in the initial and terminal dates in the several countries).
However, this upward trend may have reached its peak in the
early twentieth century when the expansion of the giant corpora-
tions may have reached its limit. The concomitant rise in the rela-
tive importance of the capital consumption allowance, a possible
source of internal financing, may have prevented a possible further
rise in the share of external financing in gross capital formation and
may have even caused a reversal. In recent decades the share of
external financing in gross business capital formation may have de-
clined while its share in net capital formation may have risen.
To summarize, the rough picture suggested is a long-term swing
in the share of external financing in business capital formation: for
the gross ratio a sustained rise over several decades culminating
early in the twentieth century, followed perhaps by a decline; for
the net ratio a rise through the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, with no indication of a decline as yet. The share of un-
distributed profits of business enterprises in net capital formation,
i.e. the share of internal financing, probably did not rise during
the period studied.
Unfortunately, the data for the United States in Table III cannot
be presented as evidence in support of these conjectures. All they
show is that the shares of government in both net and gross savings
rise somewhat and those of unincorporated enterprises decline. But
the shares of savings by individuals other than farmers, which are
probably the chief source of external financing, and the shares of
savings by business, which are probably the chief source of internal
financing, show no pronounced trends since the early twentieth
century. There is some sign of a rise in the business share and of a
decline in individua]s' share in gross savings. But this is slight cor-
roboration of our conjectures.
3. The distinction between private and public is applicable largely
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toexternal financing; and there is little doubt that,. in the process
of economic growth, opportunities for public financing of capital
formation have increased enormously and that, in consequence, the
proportion of external funds that flowed through publicly organized
channels must have grown at the expense of the share of flows
through private channels. It seems quite likely that the proportion
of publicly financed to total capital formation, whether for personal
use (residential housing) or for business use, increased significantly
in the long run. The development of the organization for the mort-
gage financing of residential housing 'and the development of the
security markets for the financing of business capital formation by
public utilities and large corporations both serve to strengthen this
inference.
The causal relation between this trend in public external financing
and the growing contribution of savings and capital formation to
economic growth can hardly be exaggerated. The development of a
financial organization that mobilized accumulated funds, that di-
rected them into the channels that—against the background of the
economy as a whole—seemed most promising, and, finally, that had
the power—unaware though the active agents may have been of
it—to create money and to generate forced savings was fundamental
to economic growth in the developed countries. This extension of
economic inventions, embodied in the financial system andtthe
legal forms of business organization and of business transactions,
prevented, or at least minimized, the danger of widespread hoarding,
on the one hand, and of misuse of savings, on the other. Without this
organization, accumulated savings might have been misdirected, if
only because the lender had to have the security of personal knowl-
edge of the borrower or had to be near the place of investment in
order to exercise some control over the use of his funds. One strik-
ing difference today between developed and underdeveloped coun-
triesis precisely in the extent to which the latter lack a well-
organized, publicly established system for channeling savings into
those types of capital formation that are recognized by the country-
wide free market as being the most promising.
I know of no data by which the relative importance of private
and public flows of savings into capital formation can be measured.
Consequently, the magnitude of the trend so strongly suggested by
history must also remain an unknown quantity. Nor can I say that
the trend has run its course—that the proportion of external financing
flowing through public channels has reached its maximum in most
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developed countries. It is quite possible, however, that this point
has been reached in the United States.
4. The growth and relative importance of intermediate financial
institutions in channeling external financing to capital-users will
be discussed by Goldsmith, and there is little need to dwell upon
them here. By and large, one would expect the share of these in-
stitutions in external financing, and for that matter in total financing
of capital formation—certainly net and perhaps even gross—to show
a definite upward trend. This appears to have been true for the
United States, and may well characterize developments in other
countries, particularly if financial intermediaries are defined to in-
clude governments (with their responsibility for funds of social
security systems, soldiers' insurance, etc.).
From our standpoint the major significance of this trend is the
transfer of responsibility for the choice of investment, and hence
indirectly of capital formation, from the individual saver to an
institutional agent. The extent to which it affects the type of capital
formation favored could be suggested only by a careful examination
of financial intermediaries—of their investment policies, of their
rules and methods of operation, and of their adaptability to long-
term changes in conditions. I do not feel competent to undertake
such an analysis.
5. These comments obviously bear on the whole complex of
problems raised by the distinction between security-motivated sav-
ings and those available for financing venture capital. The distinc-
tion is important not only for individuals' savings—those of the lower
income groups are assumed to be primarily security-motivated and
those of the top income groups are assumed to be more readily
available for financing venture capital. It is also relevant to corpo-
rate savings; the latter are quite large, particularly if taken gross
of capital consumption allowances. Without any knowledge of the
investment practices of individual savers at various income levels,
of business corporations in different industries, and of financial
intermediaries, it is not easy even to make conjectures.
Offhand, one might argue that if, as we suggest, the shares of
internal financing and of private financing declined and the share
of external financing through financial intermediaries rose, the
proportion of savings available for truly risky and venturesome
capital formation probably declined. But it is easy to exaggerate the
bearing of these trends upon the supply of funds for venture capital.
In the first place, external financing, private or public, was rarely
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available for truly risky capital formation—except when the latter
was supported by some public guarantee or privileged status (e.g.
as in the case of railroads). The genuinely experimental ventures, the
spark plugs of technological change, were financed internally. (We
include here loans from relatives, friends, etc.) If external funds
have never really served true venture capital, the trends in their
share of financing are not relevant here; they are not necessarily
less effective now than they were in the past in extensions of tested
new ventures.
Second, the decline in the share of internal financing in capital
formation may not have been any greater than the recession in the
relative needs for venture capital formation that accompanies eco-
nomic development. More important, the growth insize and
economic strength of business units increased their command over
internal financing (particularly if gross savings are considered) and
may well have made for a greater ease in allocating a larger propor-
tion of internal funds to exploratory and venturesome uses. It is
conceivable that in many developed countries the long-term shifts
from the personal and individual to the institutional type of organi-
zation were accompanied by an increase in economic power and
reserves and by a growing conviction, based on past experience, of
the value of exploratory and venturesome uses of funds to stimulate
the improvement of old and the discovery of new methods of pro-
duction, types of goods, and devices for organizing economic
activity. It may therefore be misleading to translate trends in form
of organization into trends in character of function discharged; a
less venturesome type of organization may still operate more dar-
ingly. At any rate, this question, which has been discussed to some
extent (e.g. by Schumpeter and Gaibraith in connection with the
effects of monopolistic organization on the performance of the
capitalist system in the United States), needs further serious con-
sideration.
The comments in this section were colored largely by the experi-
ence of the United States,'8 and my conjectures about trends were
derived from general knowledge of institutional changes in the
process of growth of our business economy. Some of these supposi-
tions would probably have to be modified, perhaps not decisively,
18 In fact, they are based partly on Goldsmith (op. cit.), partly on past and
current studies of the National Bureau of Economic Research relating to trends
in capital formation and financing in the United States.
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to fit the experience of other business economies. Inferences about
the structure of financing in underdeveloped countries can be made
easily. One would expect to find many of the features that char-
acterized the early phases of the trends in the developed countries:
larger shares of "barter" and internal financing; and within external
financing, larger shares of private than of public, of immediate than
of intermediate, but not necessarily of venturesome than of security-
motivated, financing. But further speculation is pointless. Our chief
purpose in writing this section was to suggest plausible inferences
that might indicate the directions that further thinking and explora-
tion should take. Because data are practically nonexistent, we could
not present a summary of evidence that would be acceptable, even
one subject to limitations of scope and accuracy similar to those





Proportions of Domestic Capital Formation to National Produôt,
Recent Years
DGCF AS % OF CNP DNCF AS % OF NNP
COUNTRY 1938 19471952a 1938 19471952a
1. United States 11.3 17.9 2.2 11.6
2. Canada 14.9 22.5 4.5 15.0
3: United Kingdom 10.4 13.3 b b
4. France b 18.6c b 9.2c,d
5. Germany, F.R. 19.2e 23.2 b b
6. Italy 18.9 20.5g 11.3 13.Ig
7. Ireland 8.8 14.3 6.7 12.0
8. Netherlands 11.1 24.5g 1.7 15.7g
9. Belgium b 16.1 b b
10. Denmark 13.7 17.6 b b
11. Norway 21.5 30.9 6.9 16.0
12. Sweden 18.8 19.6 b b
18. Austria b 21.1 b 15.3
14. Portugalh 12.8 13.1 b b
15. Greece 12.7 17.0 b b
16. Icelandh b 80.5 b b
17. Finlar,dh 22.6 30.0 b 22.6
18. Australia 21.9 30.8 17.0 26.8
19. New Zealand 19.2 23.4 18.6 18.7
20. Philippines b 10.6 b 6.8
21. Ceylonh 5.6 10.0 b b
22. Southern Rhodesia b b b 449
28. Chile 12.9' 13.21 8.8' 10.31
24. Guatemala b 10.8 b b
25. Honduras 8.7 13.0 3.1 8.4
26. Mexicob 97k 14.01 39k 751
27. Peru b 23.1 b 10.9
Percentages of totals for the period.
b No data.
CDatafor 1949-1952.
d Unadjusted for depreciation on government capital.
e Data for 1936.
Data for 1948-1952.
g Data for 1947-1951.
h Capital formation excludes changes in stocks.
Data for 1940.
I Data for 1947-1950.
k Data for 1939.




1-16 Statisticsof NationalProduct andExpenditure,1938, 1947 to 1952,
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, 1954.
17-27 Statistics of National Income and Expenditure, Statistical Paper, Series
H, No. 6, United Nations, August 1954.
All underlying totals are in current prices. Inthis and subsequent tables:
DGCF =DomesticGross Capital Formation












United States 1925-1930 19.8 12.0
Great Britain 1924-1930 13.0 5.4









Switzerland 1925-1930 19.8 12.7
Source All underlying data are in current prices.
The percentages are arithmetic means of percentages for single years, except
for the allowance for inventories in France, which is based on the net changes in
short-term credit balances for the period as a whole. The figures in parentheses
are for shares excluding inventories.
The underlying estimates of capital formation are from J. Marschak and W.
Lederer, Kapitalbildung, London, William Hodge, 1936, supplemented for
Germany by those in "Kapitalbildung und Investitionem in der deutschen
Volkswirtschaft, 1924 bis 1928," Vierteljahrshefte fur Konjunkturforschung,
Sonderheft 22, Berlin, 1931. For Switzerland they are based on money flows.
The underlying estimates of net national product are from Cohn Clark, Condi-
tions of Economic Progress, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1951, except those
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Source: The percentages are based on decade estimates in current prices.
These estimates, prepared by the National Bureau of Economic Research, are
revisions and extensions of the series published originally in Simon Kuznets'
National Product since 1869 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946).
The revisions and extensions were completed recently for the study of capital









as % of DGCF
1870-1879 10.5 8.7 18.8
1880-1889 9.2 7.4 21.2
1890-1899 9.7 7.9 20.5
1900-1909 10.6 8.8 18.7
1904-1913 9.4 7.6 21.0
Source: The percentages are based on decade averages in current prices.
The underlying data are estimates of capital formation (excluding changes in
inventories) prepared by A. K. Caimcross and cited by J. H. Lenfant in
"Great Britain's Capital Formation, 1865-1914," Economica, May 1951, pp. 151-
188; and changes in inventories estimated by E. H. Phelps Brown and S. J.
Handfield-Jones in "The Climacteric of the 1890's: A Study in the Expanding
Economy," Orford Economic Papers, New Series, October 1952, p. 305. The
national product estimates are those of A. R. Prest, "National Income of the
United Kingdom, 1870-1946," Economic Journal, March 1948, pp. 31-62.
For 1923-1939, Cohn Clark estimates net domestic additions to capital to be
20 billion LU. (The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd ed., London, Mac-
millan, 1951, p. 494). For Great Britain, excluding Ireland, the approximate
total national income for the same period is 374 billion lU. (see ibid., p. 63).
The ratio of net domestic capital formation to national income for 1924-1939
is, then, about 5 per cent.






as % of GNP
DNCF
as % of NNP
Depreciation
as % of DGCF
1861-1870 6.3 8.8 (42)
1871-1880 9.6 5.8 (42)
1881-1890 11.6 7.1 (42)
1891-1900 14.8 8.6 45.9
1901-1910 18.7 12.2 40.0
1911-1920 21.0 14.1 38.3
1921-1980 197 11.9 45.2
Source: The percentages are based on decade averages in current prices.
Based on estimates in Eric Lindahi, Einar Dahlgren, and Karin Kock, National
Income of Sweden, 1861 -1930, London, King, 1937, Parts One and Two, par-
ticularly the details in Part Two.
The underlying totals of capital formation exclude changes in inventories.
Depreciation was not given for the first three decades and we assumed that
it formed 42 per cent of domestic gross capital formation. Net national product
was adjusted to exclude the imputed income on consumers' durables other than
houses. Cross national product was computed as the sum of net national product
and depreciation.
A comparison of the estimates in this table (and in Table II-4,C), relating to
gross domestic and total capital formation proportions, with a new set based
upon recent and still unpublished work of Dr. Olof Lindahi provides fair con-
firmation of the levels and trends shown here. The new estimates suggest some-







5 % OF CNP
Exci. Inc.
DNCF AS % OF NNP
mci. Inc.Exci. Inc.
AS % OF DGCF
mci. mv. Exci. Inc.
Buckley
1. 1901-1910 27.5 23.8 19.4 15.3 36.4 42.1
2. 1911-1920 22.7 19.8 14.1 10.9 44.0 50.5
3. 1921-1980 19.2 17.4 10.2 8.2 52.2 57,6
4a. 1926-1930 21.1 18.5 12.4 9.4 47.4 54.1
Firestone
4b. 1926-1980 21.2 12.5 47.1
5. 1931-1940 18.8 4.2 72.7
6. 1941-1950 16,9 9.9 45.9
"Assuming that depreciation was 10 per cent of gross national product (following Buckley)
for lines 1-5.
Source: Based on averages in current prices for specified periods.
Lines 1 to 4a based on estimates in K. A. H. Buckley's "Real Investment in Canada, 1900
to 1930," doctoral thesis, London School of Economics, manuscript, June 1950, pp. 119 and 178.
Lines 4b to 6 based on estimates of domestic capital formation and gross national product
for 1926-1940 by 0. J. Firestone in Private and Public Investment in Canada, 1926-1951,
Ottawa, Department of Trade and Commerce, 1951. Product and depreciation estimates since
1941 are from successive publications on National Accounts of the Dominion Bureau of Sta-
tistics, particularly for 1941-1948, 1942-1949, and 1950.











1853-1878 1.90 22.2 8.5
1878-190 1.37 29.6 4.6
1903-1911 2.04 36.2 5.6
a RenéPupin in La Richesse de la France devant la Guerre (Paris, Marcel
Rivière, 1916),p.111,givesestimatesofaverage annualtotalsavings
(private, after deduction of losses)as follows: for 1853-1878, 2.20 billion
francs; for 1878-1903, 2.04 billion francs; and for 1903-1911, 3.50 billion francs.
From these are subfractd estimates of net foreign investment. Harry D. White
in The French International Accounts, 1880-1913 (Harvard University Press,
1933), pp. 121-122, shows net foreign investment balance at the beginning
of 1880 to be 9 billior francs. On the assumption that the net outstanding
balance was close to zero in 1858, the annual average of net capital exports,
1853-1880, was about 0.30 billion francs. White's estimates of net capital ex-
ports as revised by Carl Iversen in Aspects of the Theory of International
Capital Movements (J,ondon, Oxford, 1935), p.344, are:for 1880-1903,
0.67 billion francs, and for 1903-1911, 1.46 billion francs.
b CohnClark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd ed., London, Mac-
millan, 1951, p. 80.
F. Denmark
DGCF DNCF Depreciation
Period as % of GNP as % of NDP as % of DGCF
1. 1870-1879 13.6 9.5 33.6
2. 1880-1889 12.1 7.9 37.4
3. 1890-1899 14.7 10.7 80.8
4. 1900-1909 15.6 10.6 36.2
5. 1905-1914 14.8 9.4 39,2
6. 1915-1920 10.3 3.2 70.8
7. 1921-1929 10.8 5.4 52.5
8. 1930-1989 13.6 8.7 89.8
9. 1940-1946 9.9 4.3 58.8
10. 1947-1952 17.0 9.7 47.6
Average, lines 1-4 14.0 9.7 34.5
Average, lines 4, 5, 7,8 13.7 8.5 41.9
Source: All percentages are based on decade averages in current prices.
Capital formation excludes net changes in inventories. The underlying estimates
by Kjeld Bjerke are gven in "The National Product of Denmark, 1870-1952,"
Income and Wealth, Series V. Cambridge, Eng., Bowes & Bowes for Inter-
national Association for Research in Income and Wealth, in press. The ratios
are to gross national product and to net domestic product. Depreciation in-
cludes the net balance, of foreign factor payments.
The averages do not cover the 1915-1920 and 1940-1950 periods in order




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proportions of Foreign Investment to Domestic Capital Formation and to National Product,














Items 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930
Foreign investment as % of
Domestic NCF 5.1 26.9 31.2 —24.3 14.4 7.7
Domestic GCF 2.8 9.7 20.8 —1.2 10.7 4.5
NNP .7 1.3 2.0 —.8 2.0 .9
GNP .6 1.2 2.0 —.8 2.0 .9
Total CF as % of NP
Net, of NNP 12.7 6.6 9.0 7.4 17.4 18.6
Gross, of GNP 20.4 14.1 11.7 14.7 21.4 20.2





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proportions of Foreign Investment to Domestic Capital Formation and to









Net as % Gross as %
of NNPof GNP
1. 1869-1878 —10.7 —6.2 —1.5 —1.3 12.3 20.4
2. 1879-1888 —3.0 —1.8 —.4 —.4 13.4 20.7
3. 1889-1898 1.1 .6 .2 .1 14.7 23.1
4. 1899-1908 8.8 4.7 1.1 1.0 13.9 22.5
5. 1909-1918 25.4 12.7 2.7 2.5 13.5 21.9
6. 1919-1928 21.1 7.9 1.9 1.6 10.7 22.2
7. 1929-1938 24.6 3.3 .6 .5 2.8 15.3
8. 1939-1948 10.0 3.2 1.1 .9 12.5 29.5
Average, lines 1-4 —1.0







Source: Same as for Table 1-8, A.
B. United Kingdom
Items 1870-1879 1880-18891890-18991900-1909 1904-1913
Foreign investment as % of .
Domestic NCF (I) 54.2 78.8 46.2 51.1 95.8
Domestic NCF (C-L) 34.4 51.5 29.1 38.3 84.0
Domestic GCF (I) 44.0 62.1 36.7 41.6 75.6
Domestic GCF (C-L) 27.9 40.6 23.1 31.1 66.3
NNP (I) 4.7 5.8 3.6 4.5 7.3
NNP (C-L) 3.0 3.8 2.3 3.4 6.4
GNP (1) 4.8 5.7 3.6 4.4 7.1
GNP (C-L) 2.9 3.7 2.2 3.3 6.3
Total capital formation as % of NP
Net, of NNP (I) 13.4 13.2
.
11.5 18.3 14.9
Net, of NNP (C-L) 11.7 11.2 10.2 12.1 14.0
Cross, of GNP (I) 15.1 14.9 13.3 15.0 16.6
Cross, of GNP (C-L) 13.4 12.9 12.0 13.9 15.7
Source: See notes to Table 1-3, B. The lines marked C-L use estimates of net capital exports
shown by Caimcross-Lenfant. Those marked I are based on estimates by Albert H. Imlah, in
"British Balance of Payments and Export of Capital, 1816-1913," Economic History Review,
Vol. v (1952), No. 2, pp. 208-239.





FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS % OF
DECADE DNCF DGCF NNP GNP
CAPITAL PORMATION
Net as %Gross as %
of NNPof GNP
1861-1870 —49.8 —28.9 —1.9 —1.8 1.9 4.5
1871-1880 —46.9 —27.2 —2.7 —2.6 8.1 7.0
1881-1890 —79.4 —46,1 —5.6 —5.4 1.5 6.3
1891-1900 —20.7 —11.2 —1.8 —1.7 6.8 13.1
1901-1910 —27.2 —16.3 —3.3 —3.1 8.9 15.7
1911-1920 9.9 6.1 1.4 1.3 15.5 22.3
1921-1930 10.8 5.9 1.3 1.2 13.2 20.9




FOREIGN INVESTMENT ASOF Net as % Gross as
PERIOD DNCF DGCF NNP GNP of NNPof GNP
Buckley (mci. inventories)
1901-1910 —48.2 —30.7 —9.4 —8.4 10.1 19.1
1911-1920 —43.2 —24.2 —6.1 —5.5 8.0 17.2
1921-1930 —10.7 —5.1 —1.1 —1.0 9.1 18.2
1926-1930 —18.2 —9.6 —2.2 —2.0 10.1 19.1
Firestone (exci. inventories)
1926-1980 —17.5 —9.3 —2.2 —2.0 10.3 19.3
1931-1940 39.6 10.9 1.7 1.5 5.9 15.3
1941-1950 20.8 11.2 2.0 1.9 11.9 18.7
from Public Investment Source: See notes to Table 1-3, D. Foreign investment, 1926-1941,
and Capital Formation, Ottawa, Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, 1945.

















































TMENT AS % OF
ND? GNP
Net as % Gross as
of NDPof GNP
1. 1870-1879 —9.3 —6.2 —.9 —.8 8.6 12.8
2. 1880-1889 —29.4 —18.4 —2.3 —2.2 5.6 9.8
3. 1890-1899 —23.5 —16.3 —2.5 —2.4 8.2 12.3
4. 1900-1909 —23.4 —14.9 —2.5 —2.3 8.1 13.3
5. 1905-1914 —8.4 —5.1 —.8 —.7 8.6 13.9
8. 1915-1920 —108.5 —31.1 —3.5 —3.2 —.2 7.1
7. 1921-1929 +7.4 +3.5 +.4 +.4 5.8 11.1
8. 1930-1939 +22.8 +13.7 +2.0 +1.9 10.7 15.5
9. 1940-1946 +218.7 +90.1 +9.5 +9.0 13.9 18.9













Source: Same as for Table 1-3, F.


















i.1881-1890 152 (1886) —16.18 —10.6
3.1891-1900 190 (1892, 1894, 1898) —6.31 —3.3













4 Cohn Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd ed., London, Macmillan,
1951, p. 140, average of 1901-1903 and 1913-1914.
5 Ibid., 1913-1914 through 1920-1921; 1911 and 1912 assumed to be £300 million
each.
8 Ibid., 1921-1922 through 1929-1930.
2 & 3Extrapolated from 1901-1903, by income in New South Wales, for 1892, 1894, and
1898 (line 3) and 1886 (line 2). Figures for New South Wales from ibid., p. 145.
Column 2 Carl Iversen, Aspects of the Theory of International Capital Movements, London,
Oxford, 1935, p. 402.
H. Japan
Capital Imports (.....)
National or Exports (+) Ci or














1914-1919 7.97 +405.2 +5.1
1920-1929 11.68 —277.2 —2.4
Source Column
1 Shigeto Tsuru, "Long-Term Changes in the National Product of Japan since
1878," in Income and Wealth, Series III, Milton Gilbert, editor, Cambridge,
Eng., Bowes & Bowes for International Association for Research in Income
and Wealth, 1953.
2 E. P. Reubens, "Foreign Capital and Domestic Development in Japan,"
paper presented at Social Science Research Council Conference, Spring 1952.
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TABLE 11-5
Geographical Distribution of Foreign Investments,
Three Main Creditor Countries,
Eve of World War I
UNiTED KINGDOM FRANCE GERMANY
%of %of
Total Total T0t4
Empire 47.3 Colonies 8.9Europe 53.
Canada 13.7Europe (mci. Asiatic Austria-Hungary 12.
Australia 11.1 Turkey) 61.1 Turkey (in Asia) 7.
South Africa 9.8 Russia 25.1 Russia 7.
India & Ceylon 10.1 Turkey 7.3 Balkan States 7.
Other Europe 2.6 Balkan States 5.6 Spain & Portugal 7.
Austria-Hungary 4.9 Rest 10.
United States 20.0 Spain & Portugal 8.7
Rest 9.5Latin America 16.
Latin America 20.1
Argentina 8.5Latin America 13.3U.S. & Canada 15.
Brazil 3.9
Rest 7.7Egypt, Suez, South Africa (mci.
Africa 7.3 German colonies) 8.
Europe 5.8
Russia 2.9U.S. & Canada 4.4Asia (md.
Rest 2.9 German colonies) 4.
Asia 4.9
Rest of world 6.7 Rest of world 2.
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 Total 100.
(p.3.76 bill.) (45.0 bill, francs) (23.5 bill, marks
Source: Herbert Feis, Europe, theWorld'rBanker, Th70-19l4, Yale University Press, 193(
pp. 23, 51, and 74.
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TABLE III
Distribution of Net and Gross Savings
among Saver Croups, United States,













1.3 5.8 25.1 6.6
1907-1916 70.0 —5.8 3.6 23.9 8.3
1920-1929 62.8 —2.1 3.4 20.4 15.5
1920-1939 98.8 .9 —3.5 .6 5.3
1946-1949 51.8 7.2 1.4 25.3 14.3
1897-1906 43.3
In Gross Savings (at Replacement Prices)
8.1 8.4 33.5 6.8
1907-1916 46.1 3.8 6.0 35.6 8.4
1920-1929 40.2 4.1 6.3 36.5 12.9
1920-1939 42.8 6.6 4.9 35.8 9.9
1946-1949 36.1 8.0 4.4 368 14.6
Source: Based on averages of estimates (national accounting approach), in
current prices, prepared by Raymond W. Goldsmith in A Study of Saving in
the United States (Princeton University Press, 1955). Excludes savings em-
bodied in consumer durable goods and in military goods.
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APPENDIX B
Share of Depreciation in Gross Capital Formation and in Gross
National Product and the Relation between Gross and Net
Capital Formation Proportions
NOTATION
Co =netreproducible capital at beginning of time unit 0
C0 =grossnational product during time unit 0
P0net national product during time unit 0
D0 =depreciationduring time unit 0
=rateof growth of gross national product per time unit
f= proportionof gross capital formation to gross national
product
a =proportionof depreciable gross capital formation to total
gross capital formation
n =numberof time units in life of depreciable capital
ASSUMPTIONS
We assume that:
1. The terms r, f,a,and n are constant. In calculating the stock
of depreciable capital, such constancy has to be assumed for the
finite period of n time units since no such capital that is older than n
units survives. In calculating the stock of nondepreciable capital,
the constancy must be assumed for an infinite number of time units
since such capital never perishes and hence is accumulated from
time immemorial.
It should be noted that the constancy assumed here is applied
rigidly to facilitate the derivation of equations which are largely
sums of geometric progressions. In application in empirical analysis,
however, absolute invariance of these rates and proportions from
bne time unit to the next need not be implied: we can treat these
rates and proportions as averages for the n time units (or as an
average characterizing the capital stock at a given time) in which
the weights have been so set as to yield a result identical with that
yielded by a geometric progression applied to an invariable set of
ratios or proportions.
2. The term r is positive. Unless it is, the stock of nondepreciable
capital will have to be either infinitely large or determinable on
grounds that cannot be defined by simple assumptions.
3. The absolute magnitudes—gross and net national product, de-
preciation, and capital stock—are all in constant prices.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The basic procedure for deriving the equations is set forth in the
accompanying summary, which shows the cumulative sum of de-
preciated capital (the stock of depreciable capital) but which can
also be used to derive the other tenns in the necessary equations.
The arrangement demonstrates that the stock of capital at any given
time is a sum (or a sum of sums) of geometric progressions over
a period of finite n units for depreciable capital or of an infinite
number for nondepreciable capital.
The stock of depreciable capital at the beginning of time unit 0
is thus equal to
a/Co-nr—1+ (1 + r)fl
nr
For n time units the accumulation of nondepreciable capital (from
column 4 of the summary) is equal to
(1—a)fGo
But this is the cumulation of nondepreciable capital over it time
units—the life of depreciable capital. At the beginning of the nth
time unit preceding time unit 0 there already existed some nonde-
preciable capital which, by definition, persisted to time unit 0.
Obviously, the cumulation of nondepreciable capital must be de-
rived for a much larger number of time units. If for simplicity's
sake we assume that this number is infinite and provided that r is
larger than 0, i.e. positive, the stock of nondepreciable capital at
the beginning of time unit 0 becomes
(1—a)fGo
1•
Ifr is negative, the stock of nondepreciable capital would be in-
finitely large—since a negative r extended over an infinity of time
would mean that gross national product started declining from an
infinitely high level and was accompanied by an infinitely large
stock of capital.
Hence, On the assumption that r is positive, we can write the
equation for the stock of capital at the beginning of time unit 0
as follows :1
1 Itis apparent that if allcapitalis nondepreciable—which means that gross
and net capital formation are identical—equation 1 becomes
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afGo nr —1+ (1 + r) (1—a)fG0
(1)C= +
r nr
Itshould be noted that the tabular arrangement, and hence the
resulting equation, is based on the rule that capital formation during
a given time unit is not subject to depreciation until the following
time unit; that such capital formation is, as it were, concentrated
toward the end of the time unit. A modification to assume that
capital formation during a given time unit is subject to depreciation
from the beginning of that unit, rather than from the beginning of
the next, could easily be introduced.
From column 4 of the tabular arrangement we can also derive
the equation for depreciation or capital consumption for time unit




SHARE OF DEPRECIATION IN CROSS CAPiTAL FORMATION
If during time unit 0 the gross capital formation proportion equals
f,theconstant proportion assumed for the past, the share of de-






f=grossor net capital formation proportion
r =rateof growth in gross national product or net national product;
or, to put it differently: if we assume that b =netcapital formation proportion




andthe capital-output ratio is obviously
C0b
P0r'
directly proportional to the net capital formation proportion and inversely pro-
portional to the rate of growth in net national product.
This is a much simpler presentation than the one followed, but we prefer
the latter because it permits us to define and analyze elements in the transition
from gross to net capital formation.
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The following conclusions can be derived:
1. The share of depreciation in gross capital formation is not
affected by the value of faslong as fisassumed constant. In other
words, if all other determinants are kept constant, the share of de-
preciation in gross capital formation is the same whether the constant
gross capital formation proportion is 10, 15, or 50 per cent.
2. The share of depreciation in gross capital formation is directly
proportional to a, the ratio of depreciable to total capital formation.
8. An increase in r will lower the share of depreciation in gross
capital formation, since it will increase the denominator on the
right-hand side of equation 8 more than the numerator. Thus, with
a =.75and n. =40,a change in r from say .08 to .05 will lower
the share of depreciation in gross capital formation from .488 to
.822. Conversely, a decline in r will raise the share of depreciation
in gross capital formation.
4. An increase in n will lower the share of depreciation in gross
capital formation and vice versa. The increase in the denominator
of the fraction on the right-hand side of equation 3 is only partly
offset by the increase in the numerator. Thus, with a.75 and
.05, a change in n from 20.to 40 will lower the share of deprecia-
tion in gross capital formation from .467 to .822.
5. Changes in the share of depreciation in gross capital formation
produced by changes in either r or n are proportionally smaller than
the latter. Changes in a alone are exactly proportional to changes in
the shares.
These rather simple conclusions assume considerable interest in
view of the trends suggested by the empirical evidence, at least for
the United States. The rate of growth in gross national product, r,
tends to decline; the average life of depreciable capital, n, tends to
become shorter; and the proportion of depreciable to total gross
capital formation, a, tends to be constant or perhaps increase slightly.
If these findings are valid, all three variables in equation 8 raise
the share of depreciation in gross capital formation.
SHARE OF DEPRECIATION IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCE
This share is given by the following equation:
(4 Doaf{1—(1+r)']
nr
All the conclusions regarding the effects of changes in a, n, and r
stated above apply here. The only modification is the addition of f
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to the numerator of the fraction on the right-hand side of the
equation. Thus the share of depreciation in gross national product
is a direct function of fandchanges in the latter would result in
equal proportional changes in the former.
The comment concerning the effects of the determinants, as ob-
served in the experience of the United States, on the share of de-
preciation in gross capital formation applies also to their effects on
the share of depreciation in gross national product. The gross capital
formation proportion, f,hason the whole been constant. Conse-
quently, the decline in r and n and the rise, if slight, in a could raise
the share of depreciation in gross national product.
RELATION OF NET TO GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION PROPORTIONS
Given differences or changes in n, r, or a, there will be different
and changing relations between the gross and net capital formation
proportions. To derive the latter from the former, we subtract de-
preciation from both the numerator (gross capital formation) and
the denominator (gross national product). From equations S and
4 it is clear that depreciation forms one fraction of gross capital
formation and another of gross national product; and the difference
between the two varies with the changes in a, i, n, and f.However,
it is important to state the relation between gross and net capital
formation proportions explicitly.
From equation S it is apparent that net capital formation is
(5)fG0{1— a[l_(l+r)-t]}fG[nr_a[l__(l+r)]}
Since net national product, Po, equals G0 minus D0,
afG0 mr —af[1—(1+ r )"] (6)Po=Go—nr nr
Hence b, the proportion of net capital formation to net national
product, can be defined as
7 b—nr—a[1—(1+r)"]
nr—af[1—(1+r)J
Equation 7 indicates clearly the relation between fandb. So
long as r is positive and fisless than 1, the coefficient of finequa-
tion 7 will be less than 1; and b will always be smaller than f.
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APPENDIX C
Levels and Trends in Income Shares of Upper Income Groups
THEPROBLEM
Given top income groups, with their high savings-income ratio,
would the assumption of persistent identity of the members and
their descendants at the upper levels result in an upward trend in
the shares of upper groups in country-wide income? Offhand, the
answer might be in the affirmative, for two somewhat different
reasons.
The first is the effect of concentration of savings. Since upper
income groups save higher proportions of their income than lower
groups, savings are more unequally distributed than income. This
might mean that the upper groups accumulate income-yielding
assets more rapidly than the lower groups. If so, there would be a
greater concentration of such assets in the hands of a small group
at the top, wider inequality in the distribution of property income,
and, other conditions being equal, a rise in the shares of the given
upper groups in total income. However, some reflection forces a
modification of the argument. The distribution of income-yielding
assets is already unequal at the initial date of the period for which
an upward trend in upper income shares might be inferred. Since
the upper income groups hold a larger than average proportion of
income-yielding assets, they receive a larger than average share of
property incomes. Therefore, the concentration of savings would re-
suit in an increasing concentration of income-yielding assets only
if the inequality in the distribution of savings were wider than that
in the distribution of property income, and, hence, wider than the
inequality in the distribution of income-yielding assets.
But with this modification, the argument is valid and indeed sug-
gests a mechanism operating to raise the income shares of upper
income groups. To begin with an empirical example: during 1919-
1988 the top 5 per cent of the total population in the United States
accounted for 54 per cent of property income (see Simon Kuznets,
Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1958, Table 3, p. 18). If sample data
permit any judgment, we can put the average share of the top 5
per cent in total savings (of individuals) during the same decades at
about two-thirds (ibid., Chap. 6, esp. pp. 182 if.). If we assume
these figures are continuous, the proportional additions to property
holdings by the top 5 per cent group would be steadily greater than
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those by the income groups below the top to their holdings. The
5 per cent group holds only 54 per cent of assets—assumed the same
as their share in property income—but accounts for two-thirds of
current savings, i.e. of net additions to assets. Hence, the share in
total wealth of the top 5 per cent would tend to increase; and,
other conditions being equal, so would their share in total property
income. If the country-wide proportion of property to total income
does not decline, and the distribution of service income is assumed
unaffected, the share of the top 5 per cent in total income would
increase. If this share rises, the proportion of total savings accounted
for by the top 5 per cent might also rise; and the chain process would
start operating again—to increase the concentration of income-yield-
ing assets, to raise the shares of the top groups in property and in
total income, and so on. The process is not without limits: at some
point a rise in the share of upper groups in total income may not
result in further concentration of savings. But so long as inequality
in the distribution of savings is wider than that in the distribution
of property income and of income-yielding assets, there would be,
unless other factors intervened, a trend toward a higher share of
upper groups in property and hence in total income.
The second reason for assuming a rising trend in the income share
of the top group is that its superior position enables its members, or
their descendants, to occupy a continuously rising position in the
ladder of service incomes. To the extent that high service incomes
follow from long and expensive training or from a strategic owner-
ship position—in short, from either acquired skill or influence—a
given top income group is presumably in a position to provide, for
its members and their descendants, the bases for further rises.
We find, in fact, little evidence of a secular rise in the share of
upper income groups, at least in the decades covering economic
growth beyond the first turbulent phases of industrialization. This
appendix is devoted to the formulation of factors that offset such a
trend and explain why the forces indicated above have not operated
as consistently and as effectively as one would expect offhand. The
offsetting factors are discussed under three heads: the demographic
growth differentials that produce a situation in which the top
ordinal group at the initial point in the period cannot ordinarily
people, through its descendants, an identical top ordinal group a
few decades later (the mixture ratio); the factors that affect the
per capita income of a top group and its descendants, on the as-
sumption of continuity; the effect of mobility, i.e. of the abandon-
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mentof the assumption of continuity that is accepted in the discus-
sion under the first two heads.
THE MIXTURE RATIO
Assume a group in the population in year 0, at the top of the size
distribution of income. If we let M stand for population and indicate
the year by the subscript on the left and the percentage group
from the top by the subscript on the right, total population in year
ois0M100 and the top 5 per cent group (which we deal with here
for illustrative purposes) is 0M5.




Anassumption crucial to the analysis in sections 2 and 3 is now
introduced: that the individuals in the upper income group in year
oandtheir descendants remain at their high relative position, i.e.
within the top 5 per cent. On this assumption will the top 5 per cent
group of year n be completely peopled by members or descendants
of the top 5 per cent group of year 0?
If we designate the rate of increase of the number in the top
income group of year 0 by ap, their descendants, D, can be described
by the following equation:
(2) ,D05 =0M5(1 + ap)'
The mixture ratio, i.e. the ratio to the total number in the top
group of year n of the number in that group who are not descendants
of the top group of year 0, can be defined as
(
—(l+p)
In industrially advanced and rapidly growing countries, like the
United States, a may be assumed to be much less than 1—the rate
of increase of the top income group is much lower than the rate of
growth of total population. Two reasons can be adduced for this.
First, the rate of natural increase is lower for the upper income group
because its birth rate is appreciably lower. Second, total population
may increase because Of the excess of in- over out-migration. Immi-
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grants, however, are preponderantly in the low income groups. The
first reason operates in all countries whose economic development
has reached the stage of reduced death rates, differential impact
of family limitation, and declining birth rates. The second operates
only in countries with net immigration; the effect for countries with
net emigration is the opposite.
Obtaining quantitative values for the first factor requires more
knowledge than we now have concerning differences in rate of
natural increase between upper and lower income groups. That
these differences are pervasive and substantial can be seen from
recent sample studies of income and budgets for the United States,
in which a negative correlation exists between size of family and
per capita income of the unit.' As to the immigration factor, a
rough calculation shows that in the United States, of the total in-
crease of 93.1 million in population from 38.6 million in 1870 to
131.7 million in 1940, only 68.9 million or about 70 per cent can be
attributed to the natural increase of the native born of 1870.2 The
value of .5 for a used in the illustrative calculations of the mixture
ratio is fairly realistic for a country like the Unitçd States for the
period since 1870; indeed, it may be somewhat too high.
These calculations in Exhibit I show, as equation 3 indicates, that
the mixture ratio is a positive function of p and n and an inverse
function of a. For a country like the United States where p. on a per
decade basis, varies from 10 to 80 per cent, with the average since
1870 close to 20, over a period of say 5 decades the mixture ratio
can be as high as .35.
Two inferences are suggested:
1. Under the assumption of long-term continuity of the relative
position of initial upper income groups and their descendants, the
failure of such groups to reproduce themselves at as high a rate
as total population means that the income share of an upper group
will tend to decline—unless per capita incomes of the initial top
groups and their descendants grow at higher rates than the per
capita income of total population; or unless the new groups drawn
upon attain, again under assumption of a continuity of standing, by
a greater growth of their per capita income, a relative income excess
much higher than that of their initial ancestors.
1 Simon Kuznets, Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953, pp. 157-159.
2 Income and Wealth, Series Ii, Simon Kuznets, editor, Cambridge, Eng.,
Bowes & Bowes for International Association for Research in Income and
Wealth, 1952, Tables 44 and 45, pp. 197 and 200,
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EXHIBIT I
Illustrative Calculation of Mixture Ratios














3.Line 2 ± line 1 .911 .840 .783





























11.Line 10 ÷ line 9 .628 .419 .294
12.Mixture ratio (1 —line11) .37 .58 .71
2. Under the. same assumption this pressure toward a decrease
in the share of upper income groups will slacken as p, the rate of
increase of total population, slackens and as a, which measures the
relative difference between the initial top groups and total popula-
tion in the rate of increase, approaches 1.
RELATIVE TRENDS IN PER CAPITA INCOME
Designate:
01= total income, per capita, of total population in year 0
O'u = total income, per capita, of upper group in year 0
= service income, per capita,oftotal population in year 0
= service income, per capita,ofupper group in year 0
0R=property income, per capita, of total population in year 0
0R = property income, per ca pita, of upper group in year 0
g,gu, g0, gwu, gr, gre =rates of growth of these magnitudes,
distinguished by the subscripts; the rates apply to both
initial populations and their descendants.
By definition:
= 0W + oR; o'u = 0W, + 0R
= W(1 + g) + 0R(1 + gr)
= 0W, (1+ gw74 )" + 0R( 1 + g)n
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We can analyze gr,therate of growth of per capita property in-
come, somewhat further:
0R--where0R' is total property income, year 0
° 0M is total population, year 0.
0R( 1 + gr) =0R( 1+ g'r)
where g'r is rate of increase in 0R'





(6) 0R'( 1 + g'r) =0R'+(oI'sy)where 1' is total income in year 0
sissavings-income pro-
portion








(9) (1 + grt)
=











Before considering the trends in per capita income for initial
upper groups compared with those for total population, we explore
the interrelations between sandy, and gr and gw, for total popula-
tion under different assumptions (see Exhibit II). If the rates of
EXHIBIT II
Illustrative Relations






I. Assumptions: p = .02; ggw=gr
A. 4..25
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3. a, if y = .06 .126 .168 .211 .253
B. 4.20
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6.a, if y = .06 .101 .135 .169 .203
. C.4..10
7 ay .00302.00404.00506.00608
8. a, if y = .03
9. a, if y = .06
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growth in total, service, and property per capita income are assumed
equal for a given rate of growth of population: (1) the higher the
assumed rate of growth of income, the greater the implicit savings-
income proportion; (2) for given rates of growth of income, the
lower the rate of yield on savings, the higher the implicit savings-in-
come proportion; (3) the greater the share of property income in
total income, the higher the product of the required savings-income
proportion and the rate of yield—since more is necessary to maintain
such a ratio of property to total income; and (4) if we start with
assumed sandy and let gr and gw differ, g,. will be inversely and gw
will be positively related to the initial proportion of property to total
income for given values of g.
In terms of the experience of the United States, an annual p of
somewhat less than .02, a g of about .03, and a ratio of property to
total income of about .20 may be considered realistic; and a y of
.06 may be assumed. These values in the illustrative calculations sug-
gest a savings rate of .135. The actual value lies close to it.
We may turn now to the rates of growth of per capita income for
the initial upper group and total population, as set forth in equa-
tions 10 and 11. The following relations are relevant:
0W/01 is definitely greater than oW,/oI
0R/01 is definitely smaller than oR/oI
is definitely greater than s
Thefirst question is about the rates of growth of per capita service
income of total population, gw, and of the initial top group and its
descendants, gwu. It should be stressed that this is a ratio of total
service income received by a group to all Its numbers, including
units that do not engage in service activities and their dependents.
In general, gwu may be assumed to be significantly smaller than gw
—for two reasons. First, the rise in per capita service incomes (wages
and salaries, entrepreneurial income, etc.) is due to both inter- and
intra-industry shifts—to the movement of the labor force toward the
higher per capita income industries and to the rise in per capita
service income within each industry. The inter-industry shiftis
bound to have a much larger effect on gw than on gwu: the members
of the top group who derive service incomes are already likely, to be
in the higher paid industries. Since they are also likely to be in the
higher paid positions, even the intra-industry rise may not have as
great an effect on gwu as on gw.
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Second, the proportion of gainfully engaged to all members of
the top group is likely to decline—or at any rate fail to rise—even if
the proportion for total population rises. Low reproduction rates and
continuously high income position may cause a shift among the
descendants of the initial top group toward women, because of
their greater longevity as compared with men, which, combined with
lack of pressure for gainful occupation, may result in an actual de-
cline in the proportion of gainfully occupied. The combination of
the factors just adduced may mean that the rate of increase in
per capita service income of the initial top group is about half of
that for total population—in the United States, inter-industry shifts
alone account for about four-tenths of the over-all rise in net prod-
uct per worker.
The next question is about the rate of growth of per capita
property income of total population, gr,andthat of the initial
top group and its descendants, gru (see equations 8 and 9 in this
connection). Two factors tend to make significantly larger
than g,: s,withwhich the rate of growth is positively related,
is larger than s,andap,withwhich the rate of growth is negatively
related, is smaller than p. A third and important factor tends to
make grusmallerthan gr: the ratio of property to total income,
with which the rate of growth is negatively related, is larger for
the upper group than for total population. Finally, there is the
yield on accumulated savings, but no definite statement can be
made whether y4 tends to be larger or smaller than y.
With this variety of factors, and one or two of them unknown,
it seemed best to experiment with an illustrative calculation (see
Exhibit III). The following ratios and coefficients were assumed,
largely on the basis of the record for the United States from
1870 to 1940: an annual rate of growth of population of 2 per
cent per year (somewhat high) and of per capita income of 1.5
per cent per year (somewhat low); an over-all savings-income
proportion of 12 per cent and a yield of 6 per cent, both fairly
realistic figures; a constant ratio of service to total income of 80
per cent (hence the equality of g, gw,andgr),whichis also con-
firmed by whatever crude estimates of distribution of income by
type we have. In addition, the following more conjectural ratios
were used: a =.5,meaning that the rate of increase in number of




Illustrative Calculations in the Derivation of gu
(Based on Equation 11)
Assumptions: --—= .80,p =.02,g =.05,s =.12,y =.08,g =gw = gr,
.60,ap=.01,gwu=.5gw
ASSUMEDVALUES OF Su
=.30s =.20 5u= .20
=.08u =.06u.04 DERIVED
.018 .012 .008 suyu
I. Derived g
1. (1 + gwu) .6045 .6045 .6045 .6045
2. Suu .0450 .0800 .0200
3. (1+line 2)±(1+ap) 1.0847 1.0198 1.0099
4. Line 3 x. .41388 .40792 .40396
5. Line 1 + line 4 1.01838 1.01242 1.00846
6. gu (line 5 —1) .01838 .01242 .00846
II. Sq/u needed to equalize g and gu
7. (1+g) 1.015
8. Line 7 —line1 .4105
9. Line 8--y 1.02625
10. Line9X (1+ap) 1.03651
11. Line 10—1 .03651
12. SUU(line11÷--) .014604
III. needed to equalize g and gu
13. (1 + gu) 1.015 1.015 1.015
14. (1 + gwu) (line13 —line4) .60112 .60708 .61104
15. (1 + gwu) 1.0019 1.0118 1.0184
16. gwu .0019 .0118 .0184
population, and gwi =.5g0,meaning that the rate of increase of
per capita service income of the initial top group was half of the
rate of increase of per capita service income for total population.
Finally, the ratio of property to total income for the initial top
group was set at 40 per cent—implying a larger group than the
top 5 per cent. Within the framework set by these relatively realis-
tic assumptions, s,, and yu were permitted to vary.
The major conclusion suggested by these calculations is that
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a rate of growth of per capita income of the initial top group and
its descendants equal to or not much larger than the rate of growth
of per capita income of total population is quite likely. As line
12 in Exhibit III indicates, it would be attained with su!,.'uequalto
about .015. On the basis of a yield of 6 per cent this involves a
savings proportion of 25 per cent; with a lower yield it means a
higher savings proportion.
Two comments are pertinent here. First, the savings rate used
in the first column is almost as high as that found for the top 5
per cent group in sample studies during the last two decades.
But with 40 per cent of property income the group assumed here
must be larger than the top 5 per cent. Furthermore, this savings
rate was found for a group that includes significant proportions
of recent and transitory migrants int9 the top group—and they are
likely to save larger proportions of their income than the in-
dividuals continuously at high income levels. For a segment of
the population that is assumed to be at top levels for decades,
the savings-income ratio should be significantly lower than for
a segment whose recent or transitory income rises result in a
lagging adjustment of expenditures or in a deliberate utilization of
windfall income as a reservoir against the more normal, leaner
years. Hence, an s, well below .3 is more realistic.
Second, y—the yield rate for the savings of the continuous
initial top group and its descendants—may well be lower than,
rather than equal to or higher than, the yield rate for the country's
total savings. This may be due partly to the drift of such savings
into more conservative investments; but itis largely due to the
fact that our continuity assumption excludes newcomers who rise
to the top because of association with new and successful indus-
tries. It is these industries that provide the source of high property
income returns and have a bolstering effect on the yield rate
for the total pool of country-wide savings.
THEEFFECI'S OFSfflFINC
Theanalysis above suggests three conclusions. First, because
of its lower reproduction rate, the upper income group of year 0
and its descendants will constitute only part of the upper income
group of year n; and such admixture means, under the assumption
of continuity of relative position, that the relative standing of
the upper group in year n may be below the level ascribable to
the descendants of the upper group in year 0. Second, because
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the per capita service income of the descendants of the upper
group of year 0 is most likely to grow at appreciably lower rates
than the per capita service income of total population, there is
a substantial offset to any greater growth (under the assumption
of continuity) of per capita property income of the descendants
of the upper group of year 0. Therefore, even under the assump-
tion of continuity, total per capita income of these descendants
may not grow at a rate higher than that for total population.
Third, the rate of growth of property income of the initial top
group will cease exceeding the rate of growth of total property
income as soon as the share in savings is equal to or less than the
share in wealth. The combination of these three conclusions may
mean a decline, not a rise, in the share of the given top ordinal
group.
That under conditions of a progressive economy thisisa
likely rather than asurprising result follows from the three
empirical assumptions used in the analysis:(1) service income,
even for the upper income groups, was assumed to be a sub-
stantial proportion of total income; (2) the rate of reproduction
of the upper income groups was assumed to be lower than• that
of total population;(3) the per capita service income of the
upper income groups was assumed to grow at a slower rate than
the per capita service income of the economy. Two of the three
assumptions rest upon integral characteristics of a growing econ-
omy. Such growth is accompanied by substantial inter-industry
shifts, which are involved in assumption 3; by a population growth
pattern in which family limitation spreads from the top to the
lower social groups, and in which death rates are under sufficient
control so that birth rate differentials are the' most important
factor—both of which are involved in assumption 2. Thus the
inference that, given continuity in relative position (no shifting),
the share of upper income groups is likely to decline has been
derived by assumptions which are characteristics of a growing
and progressive economy—in which, because of that very fact,
there mustbeextensive shifting in relative position, into and out
of the upper income groups. For a slowly growing underdeveloped
economy the assumption of continuity might produce theop..
posite result: with the mixture ratio quite small and the effects
of inter-industryshifts 'on per capita service income possibly
negligible, the inference might well be that the income shares of
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upper income groups, under the assumption of continuity, tend
to rise.
Viewed against the background of a growing economy, the
preceding analysis isartificial in that it combines conditions of
continuity with empirical assumptions that deny them: it is hardly
a surprise that allowing growth elsewhere, but not in the upper
income groups, except for the straight accumulation of savings,
one concludes that the total incOme share of the initial upper
income group and its descendants is not likely to rise but may
decline. Yet such analysis has some value, because it distinguishes
between the elements of continuity and shift. Of particular in-
terest is the suggestion that it is the shift process that may account
for sustaining the income share of the upper income groups and
for keeping the share of service incomes in the total income of
the upper groups as high as it is.
We have no data on this shift process, but some conjectural
analysis may be useful.
1. Two obvious sources of shifting are of limited interest here.
Since our distinction of upper groups at any given time is based
on income size during a year or similarly short time span, purely
transient elements affect the income position. Units move up into
the top income groups and. drop down again when these elements
have passed. However, they are replaced by others, some of which
may likewise be raised to high levels by transient elements. Al-
though nothing can be said about its effect on any trends in the
income shares of upper groups, such shifting is important. First,
it tends to raise the income shares of the upper groups at any
given time—the shares of the same ordinal top group (say of the
top 5 per cent) based on an average extending over a longer
period would be lower. Second, it tends to raise the savings-income
proportions—not only because it increases the shares of the top
group, but also because of the possible lag of expenditures under
conditions of transitory rises of income. Third, like all shifts into
and out of the top group, it interrupts the accumulation, in the
same hands, of high income and large savings.
Likewise, cyclical elements in the shift—associated with differing
sensitivity to business cycles of various industries, occupations, types
of income, etc.—do not call for extended discussion. Their effects
are similar to those of the more transient shifts just noted. Although
they serve to maintain the high income shares and high savings pro-
portions at any given point of time, and reduce continuity and
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hence the power of accumulation of assets in a few hands, they are
of less interest here than the secular factors that can produce some
long-term shifts in relative position of groups in the size distribu-
tion of income.
2. One such secular shift has been stressed in the preceding
analysis. The lower reproduction rates of the upper income groups
mean that for a given top group there must be inflow from below
the top, i.e. from newcomers or descendants of the groups below the
top in year 0. But this shift would not offset any possible decline in
the shares of the top groups unless the rate of growth in per capita
income of the groups drafted from below the top were very much
higher than the rise in per capita income for total population—and
there is no ground for this assumption. However, this shift does help
to offset declines in the proportion of service to total incomes among
the upper income groups.
The secular shift among industries and occupations is of greater
interest. Economic growth is accompanied by continuous changes
in industrial structure so that at successive points of time different
industries are in the vanguard of growth. It is attachment to such
industries that places people at the top of the economic ladder—as
is indicated by the succession of captains of industry who are the
conspicuous members of the top income group. Two aspects of such
continuous inter-industry shifts are important for their effects on the
top income group. First, the economic leaders of one industrial epoch
cannot be identified with those of another: the descendants of the
fur trade magnates are not the leading entrepreneurs in railroads and
the descendants of the latter are not the leading entrepreneurs in
the automobile industry. This continuous change in the family
identity of successful entrepreneurs—large and medium—prevents
the concentration of high income position associated with participa-
tion in the several leading industries over generations. Second, the
entry of these units into the upper income groups when it occurs
and in its early periods is via high service incomes; only at the
later stages does property income become important.
One can oniy conjecture whether the entry of successful entre-
preneurs (or other economic agents) connected with the continu-
ously emerging successful and rapidly growing industries serves to
overcome the otherwise possibly downward trend in the share of
upper income groups, or even to convert it into a rising trend. That
the effect is bolstering is obvious: the relative income excess (over
the country-wide average) of these new entrants must be greater
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than that of those whom they displace. But how great the effect is,
it is impossible to tell.
Two corollaries follow from this analysis. First, if the sustaining
effect upon upper income shares is imparted only by new entries
and new entries are associated with the emergence of new indus-
tries, there is a direct positive connection between the process of
growth and the share of upper income groups—offsetting the pos-
sibly negative connection inferred above under the assumption of
continuity. Second, the slowing down of such change, of the emer-
gence of new industries, would, of course, tend to weaken the sustain-
ing effect on upper income shares. However, one should define the
effect properly. It may well be that, even though the rate of growth
and of additions of new industries slackens, the relative income ad-
vantages grow apace. For example, if the automobile industry
yielded a new group at the top of the income pyramid with a per
capita income x times that of the average, whereas an earlier eco-
nomic leader-industry, say the 'railroads, yielded a top group with
a per capita income only .8x times that of the average (with both
top groups the same proportion of total population), the automobile
industry—even if it 'did not boost total economic growth as much
as the railroads—did have a larger sustaining effect on the shares
of upper income groups.
The comments on the effect of new industries apply equally to
the effect of new occupations (which often develop in connection
with new industries). The one modification is that there may be
greater continuity in inheritance of occupation than in inheritance of
the association with the leader-industry. One can envisage a suc-
cession of surgeons, engineers, or lawyers in the family line more
easily than a succession of successful entrepreneurs. But even the
former is not too likely if we: (1) think of the very top ranks within
one and the same occupation; and (2) consider the shifts among
leader occupations. and professions, so that the succession ought
to be traced from the successful surgeon to the successful adver-
tising-slogan-maker or from the popular preacher to the eminent
movie comedian. Top income position in the same family line by
virtue of occupation is perhaps scarcely more probable than by
virtue of industry association.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
1. The preceding analysis yields no definite conclusions concern-
ing the factors that limit either the level of or the possible rise in
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the income share of upper income groups. But it suggests that in
a growing economy: (a) assumption of continuity of an initial top
group and its descendants may well result in a decline rather than
a rise of income shares of top groups; and (b) the shifting process,
while interrupting the accumulation of savings and assets in the
same levels, tends to bolster the income (and even more, the sav-
ings) share of upper income groups. In other words, the analysis
casts doubt upon the possibility of rising trends—and hence high
levels—of income shares of upper groups, due to cumulative effects
of high savings rates and presumptively growing concentration of
assets.
2. In the light of this summary, omissions in the analysis may well
be noted. First, limited consideration was given to the inequality
structure within service income distribution proper. Yet the factors
that determine the range of income flowing out of active connection
as an employee or entrepreneur, or any trend in that range, must also
affect the income shares of upper income groups and their trends.
Second, the discussion was exclusively in terms of what happens
within and to the upper income groups themselves. But their in-
come shares can be moved by what happens at the low income levels.
No consideration was given to any possible secular trends originat-
ing in movements endogenous to the lower income group; and it is
hard to see any long-term factors there. But some complexes of
factors can affect what might be called long swings in the upper in-
come proportions. For example, the upper groups are largely urban.
If there are protracted price level movements up or down (like the
decline from the 1870's to the late 1890's), and if these movements
have a greater impact on agriculture than on urban pursuits
(as is usually the case), the very buoyant or depressed position of
agriculture over two or three decades may be reflected in a lower
or higher share of upper income groups (even in terms of constant
prices—so long as there is no intra-country differential price cor-
rection). It may well be that from the 1870's to the 1890's the shares
of the upper income groups in the United States increased, and pos-
sibly largely for that reason. On the other hand, during protracted
war and postwar periods, reduction in unemployment and the effect
of inflation on the service income differentials may raise substantially,
and for long periods, the share of the lower income groups and auto-
matically reduce that of upper income groups—the impulse coming,
so to speak, from the bottom rather than from the top. Finally, there
is the whole matter of government policy which can affect the shares
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of upper groups—not only by a progressive income tax, but also
by diverting an increasing proportion of new investment into new
industries under public auspices (vide atomic energy), leaving less
for new industries under private auspices and hence reducing the
bolstering effect of new industries on upper income shares.
Our interest in the shares of upper income groups in income
stemmed from concern with levels and trends in the contribution of
upperincome groups to country-wide savings. Abstractly, it is quite
possible for a iow level and constancy or down-trend in the income
share of upper groups to be accompanied by a high level and rise
in their savings-income ratio—so that their savings, expressed as a
percentage of total income, would remain constant or rise. No con-
sideration of the levels and trends in the savings-income ratio of
the upper income groups was intended here.
APPENDIX D
Analysis of Savings of Lower Income Groups
SIMPLESTMODEL: SAVINGS FOR RETIBEMENT ALONE; CONSTANT POPU-
LATION, INCOME, AND EXPENDITURES
We assume that savings are accumulated only to cover living
expenses during retirement. Designate:
n =numberof years in working life
K =numberof years in assumed retirement
W =numberof persons (units) working
o =numberof persons (units) retired.
If population, age composition, age of entry into working life, and




I =incomeper worker unit (including dependents)
Eexpenditures per worker and per retired unit
Ssavings per worker unit.









Grosssavings for all iow income groups are, by assumption, WS.
Cross dissavings for all low income groups are, by assumption,
OXE=0(I—S)=OI—OS=S(W+O)—OS
=sw+os—0s=ws
Netsavings for all iow income groups are
Ws—Ws——0
Note that:







8SIE1 /__WI Oa 7I —W+0a)W+0a
This would mean a lower gross savings-income ratio for worker
units, a smaller volume of gross savings and dissavings, and net
savings still equal to zero.
2. To assume an interest return on savings in the process of their
accumulation would make no difference in the analysis, since the
interest would be included in I and in S. It would mean that the
retired units 0 would be getting some income on their gradually
dwindling savings balances. But this is tantamount to having a lower
rate of expenditure per unit, and alternative interest rates could be




Assume that population grows and affects W immediately and
that we pass from W0 to W,, in n years. Throughout this period,
until the end of the nth year, 0 remains unchanged, i.e. 0,=Oo.
But W,, is obviously larger than Wo.
Assume that W grows at the rate r. Hence,
W0 Wo Wi=Wo——+—(1+r)
W0 W0 2W0 W0 W2=Wi____+___(1+r)2W0_+__[(1+r)+(1+r)2]
w0=w0—flWOWO[(1)(1)2(1)]
Since, with growth in population, W will always be larger than 0,
by the cumulated effect of the n. years between entry into 0 and
entry into W, equation 9 combined with 0 =0will yield the
excess of W over 0 under conditions of constant r in W (and in 0).
In year n, total gross savings will be
(10) WS=WoS'[(1+r)—1]
Total gross dissavings will be the same as under the assumption of
constant population, W0S.
Hence, net total savings for all low income groups will be
(11) N8=WOS({l+r[(1+f)n_1]}_1)









Ifr is larger than 0, i.e. if population grows, the coefficient of S/I
in equation 12 is necessarily positive and a proper fraction. Thus
the proportion of total net savings to total income is a fraction of
the proportion of gross savings of the W group. In other words, the
lower income groups as a whole generate positive net savings.
Illustrative calculations show how the coefficient of S/I in equa-
tion 12 varies with values of r and n (see Exhibit I). Obviously, the
EXHIBIT I
Variations in the Coefficient of S/I in Equation 12
with Alternative Values of r and n
VALUES OF r, PER YEAR
.01 .02 —.01
n=25
1. rn .25 .50 —.25
2. (1 + r) 1.01 1.02 .99
3. (1 + r)/rn (line 2 ÷ line 1) 4.04 2.04 —3.96
4. (1 + r) 1.282 1.640 .778
5. (1--r)"—l .282 .640 —.222
6. [(1 + r)/rn][(1 + r)" —1](line 3 X line 5) 1.139281.30560 .87912
7. Coefficient of S/I [(line 8— 1) ÷ line 61 .122 .234 —.138
n =45
1. rn .45 .90
2. (1+r) 1.01 1.02
3. (1 + r)/rn (line 2-i-line 1) 2.244 1.133
4. (1+r)" 1,565 2.438
5. (1 + r)" —1 .565 1.438.
6. [(1 + r)/i'n}[(l +r)"—1](line 3 )< line 5) 1.2679 1.6293
7. Coefficient of S/I [(line 6— 1) ±line6] .211 .386
larger r and n are, the larger the coefficient is. As a matter of curi-
osity we also calculate the coefficient for a negative r, i.e. on the
assumption of declining population. In that case, net savings are
101KUZNETS
negative since the declining body of workers W, saving for their
own future in accordance with the ratio set by n and K, accumulate
gross savings that are smaller than the current dissavings of the re-
tired who originated in a larger population.
During the last century to century and a half, growth processes
tended to bring about a decline in the rate of growth of population—
i.e. a decline in the positive value of r—and a rise in the ratio of K,
years of retirement, to n, years of work. Since these two trends have
opposite effects on the net savings proportion generated by the
lower income groups, their combination may have made for stability
in the proportion.
Let us assume that, in the early phases, population grows 2 per
cent per year; n, beginning at 15 years of age, covers 45 years; and K,
starting at 60, is 10 years. The gross savings-income ratio, S/I,
equals
The coefficient of S/I, under these assumptions, is .886, and the net
savings proportion for the lower income groups as a whole is .182
X .886, or .070, i.e. about 7 per cent. Now let us assume that, in
later phases of development, population growth slackens to 1 per
cent per year; n, beginning at 20, is cut down to 25; and K, starting
at 45, is extended to 25. Under these conditions S/I is .50; the coef-
ficient of S/I is .122; and the net savings proportion is .061. In other
words, with a retardation in the rate of population growth, and with
a marked reduction in years of work and a marked increase in years
of retirement, the required net savings proportion for the group as
a whole declines. With somewhat different figures, it would have
been possible to show stability, or a slight rise in the net savings pro-
portions. The major point of the illustration is the slight change in
the net savings proportion, with major changes in rate of population
growth and distribution of adult life between work and retirement.
Incidentally, this combination of trends increases both gross sav-
ings and dissavings. Thus, in the early phase, gross savings were
18.2 per cent of total income and dissavings were 11.2 per cent
(leaving 7 per cent as the net savings residual). The gross flow of
savings (savings plus dissavings, regardless of sign) was, therefore,
29.4 per cent of income. In the later phase, gross savings were 50
per cent, dissavings were 43.9 per cent, and net savings were 6.1
per cent of income. The gross flow of savings was 93.9 per cent of
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income, or more than triple that in the first phases. If the two trends
suggested have any empirical bearing on the development of modern
economies, the functions of financial institutions must have increased
substantially in order to accommodate themselves to the increase
in gross savings flows.
VARIATIONS IN SAVINGS PLANS AND REALIZATIONS
To the extent that we deal with security calculations, one may
argue that plans are made for the accumulation of savings sufficient
for the longest reasonably expected lifetime. In fact, of course, peo-
pie do not live that long; and the difference between the assumed
and actual lifetimes will mean net savings for the total of all low
income groups, because realized dissavings will be lower than those
assumed and covered by positive savings. This case is different from
that mentioned at the beginning of this appendix because in the
latter a lower level of expenditures upon retirement, i.e. of dis-
savings, was allowed for in the savings plan and net savings were,
therefore, zero. In the present case, net savings are positive. For
example, if instead of K, the number of years planned for retire-
ment, only K/2 years are in fact lived through, the average num-
ber of retired units 0 is cut in half and net savings are generated
because WS is larger than OE/2.
Whether this reasoning has any empirical bearing is a moot ques-
tion. It is far from evident that people do overestimate length of
life in making savings plans or even that they give such plans
serious consideration at all. One may plausibly argue that, on the
contrary, people tend to underestimate years of retirement and pos-
sible dependence. At any rate, this is not a question that can be
profitably discussed in conjectural terms.
Net savings would also be realized if some provision is made for
estates, i.e.if savings plans cover not only living expenses upon
retirement but also some residue for survivors. The equations would
have to be changed to satisfy this assumption since the yield rate
on accumulations would be more important than in the present
model and the net savings proportion would be determined largely
by the ratio of the estate planned (or the return on it) to assumed
income levels.
Of somewhat greater interest in the present connection is the
possibility of a systematic difference between the expenditure levels
1Seediscussion in "Proportion of Capital Formation to National Product,"
American Economic Review, Proceedings, May 1952, pp. 508-526.
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per unit of the working and of the retired population, a difference
associated with a growth in per unit expenditures not unlike the
growth in population. Because retired units are assumed to be older
than working units, the former may have established their expendi-
ture patterns (which tend to become fixed after a certain stage in
life) before the working population; and in an economy in which in-
come and expenditures per unit are growing, expenditures per re-
tired unit are likely to be lower than those per working unit. In-
cidentally, savings plans are based upon such expenditure levels be-
cause they are found satisfactory, not because of any economy
pressures.
Assume, for example, that expenditure patterns become pretty
well fixed by the middle of working life, and that these fixed pat-
terns are the basis of savings and retirement plans. Assume also, for
simplicity in calculation, that this level is the basis for savings
throughout working life. There is, therefore, a gap of n/2 years
between the date at which the expen4iture levels that are the basis
for savings plans prevail and the date when retirement begins. As-
sume also that per unit expenditures grow t per cent per year, re-
flecting a similar growth in per unit incomç—so that savings plans
set at progressively advancing dates are based on desired expendi-
ture levels that also grow at the rate of t per cent per year. We thus
have a setup similar to that for population growth, except that the
cumulation period is n/2 rather than n years.
We can now give the equations that take account of both popula-





The addition of this lag of the expenditure levels that are the
basis of savings plans behind those current when the plans are
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realized increases the possibility of net saving, and similarly to
the assumption of population growth—provided, of course, that
income and expenditures per unit do grow. The coefficient of S/i
in equation 15 is larger than that in equation 12.
Here also we can assume two trends posited in the discussion of
population growth: a decrease in n and an increase in K and a de-
cline in the rate of growth in per unit income or expenditures, t.
The former trend, of course, raises the value of S/I; both trends
diminish the coefficient since n and t are reduced. The two trends
combined thus have opposite effects On the net savings proportion
that may offset each other. Their effects on the gross savings flow
are the same as were indicated under "Population Growth."
EXHIBIT II
Variations in the Coefficient of S/I in
Equation15 under Alternative





2.2(1 + t) 2.02 2.04
3.2(1+t)/tn (line 2+line 1) 8.08 4.08
4.(1 + t)" 1.18241.281
5.(1+t)"—1 .1824 .281
6.[2(1 + t)/tn][(1 + t)" —1](line 3 x line 5) 1.06981.1465
7.[(1 + r)/rn][(1 + r)"— 1] 1.189281.18928
8.{[2(1+t)tn][(1+t)'"1]}{[(1+r)/rn][(1+r)"1]}
9.
(combined with population) (line 8 X line 7) 1.21881.3062






2(1 + t)/tn (line 2 ÷ line 1) 4.49 2.27
(1+t)" 1.25091.5814
5.(1 + t)" —1 .2509 .5614




(combined with population) (line 6 x line 7) 1.42831.6158
Coefficient of S/I [(line 8— 1) ± line 8] .800 .881
EFFECT OF UNIT ORGANIZATION
We have assumed so far that working and retired units are
separate. Sjnce the large, and often joint, family structure is prevalent
in underdeveloped countries and the small family predominates in
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the developed countries, we may ask how different assumptions con-
cerning jointness or separateness of working and retired units would
affect the analysis.
We use the simplest model here, and assume that there are no
separate retired units—that each is joined with a working unit. The
total number of units is reduced from (W + 0) to W since 0, by
assumption, is joined with W. Then, if we designate the lone work-
ing units as Y, and the joint units as Z (i.e. working plus retired),
we get 1' + Z =W.
If, for example; W is three times 0, i.e. n is 45 years and K is 15
years, it follows that Z equals one-third and Y equals two-thirds of
W; or Z equals one-half of Y.
For each unit under Z there is dissaving. Expenditures are 75 per
cent of income for the working part and 75 per cent for the retired.
Total expenditures are 150 per cent of income, and dissavings are,
therefore, 50 per cent of income. For each unit under Y, savings are
still 25 per cent of income. Thus gross savings, YS, are .67WS, gross
dissavings, 2ZS, are .67WS, and net savings are zero.
The reduction in the number of units by the joining of retired
with working units has no effect on net savings. It could have an
effect only if our assumptions concerning expenditure levels at re-
tirement and constancy of income and numbers had been modified.
However, the gross flow of savings—the total of gross savings and
dissavings—is affected. In the model with separate retired units,
gross savings are WS and gross dissavings are WS; and their sum,
signs disregarded, is therefore 2WS. When retired units are joined
with working units, reducing the total number of units, the sum
of gross savings and dissavings becomes 1.SSWS. Reduction of a
third in the number of units means a reduction of a third in the
gross flow of savings. The implication for the differences between
underdeveloped and developed economies in the role of financial
institutions handling savings flows is obvious.
The important conclusion is that, in and of themselves, the num-
ber and cOmposition of the units can have no effect on the net
savings proportion. Such an effect would have to be exercised
through some other channel—most likely the choice, made con-
sciously or unconsciously, between investing in more children or the
younger generation and the accumulation of savings in forms that
can be employed to finance capital formation (as usually defined).
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C 0 M M E N T
EVSEY D. DOMAR, The Johns Hopkins University
Anyone who discusses a Kuznets paper inevitably faces a dilemma:
he is presented with a wealth of material, he wants to raise a number
of questions, but, alas, he is given so little time. I shall therefore take
the virtues of the paper for granted and comment on a few doubtful
points, concentrating not on the statistical data—this would require
a paper in itself—but on questions of interpretation and concept.
The author begins with the observation that capital formation,
usually defined to include expenditures on construction and on pro-
ducer durables, does not include outlays on education, training, re-
search, public health, etc., which are not less important for growth
than is investment in physical capital. This is perfectly true, but
must all these expenditures be squeezed into a single category?
If outlays on education and training, for instance, were merged with
those on physical capital, it would be necessary to allow for the
depreciation or replacement of human beings as well as of physical
capital. Is it not better to record such expenditures separately and
then work with, and think in terms of, multiple rather than simple
regression? Surely no one imagines that capital formation, even
broadly defined, can be the sole explanation and cause of growth.
Kuznets would like to divide all outlays into those that raise
productivity and those that do not; he suspects that the former may
constitute as much as 50 per cent in developed countries, and only a
few per cent in underdeveloped ones (page 22). Perhaps it would
be proper to add one more category—productivity-sustaining out-
lays, such as necessary food and shelter, a minimum of education,
and so on. In underdeveloped countries most outlays are of this
nature; while a developed one devotes a good part of its resources
to luxuries which neither sustain nor raise its productive capacity.
A study in terms of these three categories would facilitate our
understanding of the relationship between allocation of resources
and growth; in particular, it would show not only the small fraction
of resources devoted to an expansion of productive capacity in
an underdeveloped country, but also the difficulty of raising this
fraction without affecting those outlays without which the present
capacity cannot be sustained.
This division of total outlays into two or three categories is, how-
ever, a task for the future, and both author and readers must be
reconciled to dealing with capital formation more or less as tradi-
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tionally defined, though here I do not share Kuznets' reluctance to
treat residential housing equally with other forms of physical capi-
tal. In any case, capital formation as one of the determinants of
growth should be expressed in real terms; it is regrettable that the
author has not found it possible to take this important step. So long
as we deal with gross capital formation, price deflation is less
urgent because prices of capital goods usually move more or less
in the same direction as do the others. But the use of net capital
formation, either as an absolute magnitude or as a fraction of total
output, requires estimates of depreciation of capital, and unless these
estimates have been corrected for price changes the result can be
quite unreliable. Net capital formation is, after all, a relatively small
residual. Is it possible that the failure to deflate can account for
the unexpectedly small ratio of depreciation to gross investment in
the United Kingdom (Table 1-8, B) as compared with this country?
The ratio of depreciation to gross investment is an inverse function
of the rate of growth of 'investment and longevity of capital; hence,
with a higher American rate of growth one would expect this ratio to
be lower than in Britain, unless the longevity of British capital were
very much greater than ours. The deflation of output and investment
series for a number of countries Over a long span of time, however,
is easy to suggest but difficult to construct. Let us keep the nature
of the estimates in mind and be grateful to the author for what he
has already done, rather than carp on that which he has not yet
done.
Our next problem deals with the variables in terms of which inter-
national and intertemporal comparisons should be made. Should
we take, for instance, the gross propensity to save (the ratio of
gross investment to gross national product) or the net propensity to
save (the ratio of net investment to net national product)? Kuznets
presents both without committing himself definitely, though he
seems to lean toward the net propensity to save. He introduces two
other variables—the average longevity of capital and the capital
coefficient—and illustrates their interactions by means of numerical
examples. This presupposes, and quite correctly, that these five
variables—the gross and the net propensity to save, the rate of
growth, the capital coefficient, and the longevity of capital—are
somehow related to one another, but I was not able to find any-
where in the paper an explicit statement of the nature of this inter-
relationship. And, fortunately or unfortunately, there are quite a
few possibilities. One can take, for instance, the net or the gross
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propensity to save as well as the longevity of capital and the capital
coefficient as given, and derive from them the rate of growth; or
one can take the rate of growth as given, and perhaps also the
capital coefficient and the longevity of capital, and derive the gross
or net propensity to save. It is also possible to make some one
variable (such as the capital coefficient) a function of another (the
longevity of capital) or vice versa. Finally, they can all be thrown
into a simultaneous system in which every variable is dependent on
all the others. But unless the relationship assumed is explicitly
indicated, it is difficult to understand the significance of Kuznets'
numerical illustrations and to decide which variables should be used
to make international or intertemporal comparisons.
Consider, for instance, the choice between the net and the gross
propensity to save. If the productive capacity of capital declines
more or less in accordance with the usual depreciation methods, it
is the net capital coefficient (that is, the ratio between capital net
of depreciation and net output, or between their respective incre-
ments) rather than the gross coefficient that is relevant. If, in addi-
tion, net savings are a function of net national product, the net
propensity to save should be used. The magnitude of the gross pro-
pensity is then of little significance, though it may retain a certain
statistical interest. On the other hand, if the productive capacity
of capital remains relatively unimpaired until its retirement (which
takes place because of technological obsolescence rather than physi-
cal deterioration), the gross capital coefficient (that is, the ratio
between the stock of capital gross of depreciation and the gross
national product, or between their respective increments) is rele-
vant. If it also happens that no depreciation charges are set aside
as a part of gross savings, and the latter are simply determined as
some fraction of gross national product (by a planning authority,
for instance), the net propensity to save has no significance as a
variable and comparisons should be made in terms of gross. Finally,
if the gross capital coefficient is retained as the significant variable,
but gross savings consist of depreciation charges set aside, and net
savings are determined independently (which, roughly speaking,
is true of a capitalist economy), both the net and the gross pro-
pensity to save are significant: the net because it is an independent
component of the total, and the gross because it is directly con-
nected (via the capital coefficient) with the, rate of growth. The
gross propensity would of course have to be adjusted to allow for
the cost of replacement.
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Attimes one gets the impression that Kuznets is thinking in terms
of a simultaneous relationship among these variables. Thus he pre-
sents a very interesting hypothesis (pages 48-50) which makes the
net propensity to save a function of the rates of growth of popula-
tion and income. But one cannot simply say, as he does on page 27,
that the net savings are the limiting factor in growth, because a
higher rate of growth might affect the propensity to save. In any
case, why should a reduction in the latter over time be explained by
a fall in the net capital coefficient (page 82)? Instead, wouldn't this
fall increase the rate of growth? Or does the author treat the rate
of growth as given (by whom?) and assume that the other variables
get somehow adjusted to it?
The absence of an explicit model creates a certain lack of clarity
in the author's discussion of international capital movements as
well. If savings are the limiting factor in capital formation, as
Kuznets states (good-bye, Keynesian economics!), capital imports
can be added to domestic savings irrespective of the direct use to
which the borrowed funds are put. Thus the old Russian govern-
ment might very well have used the proceeds of its foreign loans
for secret police, the state church, and pogroms, as the author sug-
gests (page 34), but, unless these expenditures were made possible
only by foreign loans (which is rather doubtful), capital imports
did increase the total volume of savings available for Russian do-
mestic investment.
The mere fact that, as Kuznets shows, international capital move-
ments have been relatively small (and here a comparison with
domestic gross or net savings should be more meaningful than with
total net or gross national product) need not imply that they have
been unimportant, particularly for the receiving country. Foreign
capital has brought with it new techniques and new management,
and has been frequently invested in highly strategic industries. This,
for instance, was the case in prerevolutionary Russia.
Finally, a word about the types of financing of capital formation.
This is a very important subject, and I found Kuznets' introduction
to it most stimulating. Since depreciation charges are at best very
approximate estimates of capital deterioration, gross capital expendi-
tures of a firm or of an industry appear to me more significant than
net; hence, a study in terms of gross expenditures will give a truer
picture of the relative importance of their component parts, namely
external funds, depreciation charges, and retained net earnings. Of
the three, depreciation charges in this country have been, at least
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in recent times, by far the most important component: over the
period 1929-1952 (with the exception of war years) they exceeded
individual savings by a ratio of almost 3 to 1, and not all individual
savings were invested in business. Together with retained net earn-
ings, depreciation charges allow a well-established, reasonably suc-
cessful, and not too rapidly growing firm to achieve practically com-
plete independence from external financing. This, of course, is not
true of new and/or rapidly growing firms; the sources of their
financing are a subject certainly worth an investigation.
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